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THE DEBT PARADOX: IN DEBT BUT SOCIETY OWES
YOU A DEBT
AN EXONEREE’S PATH TO HOLISTIC RELIEF THROUGH THE
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
ABSTRACT
What do the bankruptcy system and the criminal legal system have in
common? Both aim to provide fresh starts to those who have moved through
them. The bankruptcy system does so by rewarding honest but unfortunate
debtors with discharge from debt. The criminal legal system attempts to provide
a fresh start through reentry programs to those exiting prison. Yet neither system
successfully ensures a blank slate, which is in part due to the history of racial
bias in both systems. A limited subset of debtors benefits from the bankruptcy
system, while the criminal legal system makes reentry very difficult for convicted
felons. The wrongfully convicted are also not provided the necessary tools to
obtain a fresh start as they reenter society. With restricted access to reentry
programs, further injury due to barriers they face upon reentry, and debt
stemming from their wrongful conviction, exonerees require a more holistic
approach to ensure that they have a fresh start. The bankruptcy system offers an
opportunity to meaningfully improve reentry for the wrongfully convicted.
This Comment proposes that exonerees should be entitled to an expedited
chapter 13 discharge of the debt stemming from their wrongful conviction.
Further, this Comment argues that states should provide more holistic reentry
programs that include access to bankruptcy attorney services. Discharging this
debt would relieve exonerees and their families of some of the misfortune caused
by wrongful conviction. By doing so, the bankruptcy system would promote its
goal of providing a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate debtor.

SELDEN_12.16.20

96

12/16/2020 2:14 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

INTRODUCTION
The United States bankruptcy system has long recognized two central aims:
(1) providing a fresh start to debtors who are unable to pay their debt; while (2)
recognizing the interests of creditors by maximizing total return through an
efficient process.1 The goal of providing a fresh start can also be found in the
criminal legal system through programs that strive to support individuals as they
reenter society after being released from prison. Yet the mechanisms in place to
help ensure these fresh starts—the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
and reentry programs in the criminal legal system—have elicited extensive
criticism.
The fresh starts offered by the bankruptcy system and the criminal legal
system have been limited by each system’s history of racial bias. In the
bankruptcy system, this is evident in the racial disparity between groups that
have benefited most from the Code.2 The complexity of the bankruptcy system
also presents a huge challenge for pro se debtors, leaving unanswered the
question of how many debtors choose not to file for bankruptcy due to the
inaccessibility of the courts.3
The criminal legal system has an overt history of systemic racism, which is
clear at every stage of the criminal legal process.4 The United States incarcerates
the highest population of any country in the word, which was fueled by the “war
on drugs” and the “tough on crime” approach to criminal reform.5 The prison
population doubled between 1980 and 1988, with communities of color being
incarcerated at a staggeringly high rate.6 While these numbers have decreased
by 34% since 2006, Black Americans are still disproportionately imprisoned.7
At the end of 2018, Black Americans represented 33% of the prison population,

1
See In re Selinsky, 365 B.R. 260, 267 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (“Bankruptcy is an equitable process. It
is a process for debtors to get a fresh start. The goal of every bankruptcy case should be a discharge of debts and
maximizing value for creditors.”).
2
See A. Mechele Dickerson, Racial Steering in Bankruptcy, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 623, 638–39
(2012).
3
See id. at 630–31; Rafael I. Pardo, Taking Bankruptcy Rights Seriously, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1115, 1115
(2016).
4
United States Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/US.html (last
visited Aug. 31, 2020); James Cullen, The History of Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (July 20, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/history-mass-incarceration.
5
Id.
6
Cullen, supra note 4.
7
John Gramlich, Black Imprisonment Rate in the U.S. has Fallen by a Third Since 2006, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (May 6, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/06/share-of-black-white-hispanic-americans-inprison-2018-vs-2006/.
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although Black Americans make up only 12% of the United States population.8
Black people are stopped more frequently on the street by police, have a higher
likelihood of being subjected to the use of force, and are more likely to be
arrested and to be arrested repeatedly in the same year.9 Further, as the
population of incarcerated Black Americans has decreased, these individuals
leave prison with inadequate assistance to reenter society, as they face barriers
with health, housing, and employment that stem from their status as convicted
felons.10 Thus, racial disparities within the criminal legal system are also
pervasive in reentry systems.
Unsurprisingly, a system with such bias has led to a staggering number of
wrongful convictions.11 Exonerees, however, are often denied access to
traditional reentry programs. The bankruptcy system provides an opportunity to
assist exonerees as they reenter society. Many argue that exonerees should be
compensated for the injuries they have suffered due to their wrongful conviction;
“[t]he state whose actions have put individuals in prison for crimes they did not
commit owes a debt to those who through no fault of their own have lost years
and opportunity. The debt should be recognized and paid.”12 Yet who bears the
burden of repaying the debt that society owes to the wrongfully convicted? This
remains an open question. Some jurisdictions provide compensation to
exonerees, but this system is unreliable and often inadequate.13 Even when the
exonerees have been compensated, the compensation schemes do not take into
account all of the challenges they face when reentering society.14
For example, although mechanisms exist to compensate exonerees for the
pain, trauma, and lost earning potential they suffered by being imprisoned for
crimes they did not commit, exonerees and their families, on their own, must
8

Id.
Wendy Sawyer, Visualizing the Racial Disparities in Mass Incarceration, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(July 27, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2020/07/27/disparities/.
10
ADIAH PRICE-TUCKER ET AL., SUCCESSFUL REENTRY: A COMMUNITY-LEVEL ANALYSIS 19–20 (2019),
https://iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/sources/program/IOP_Policy_Program_2019_Reentry_Policy.pdf.
11
See Wrongful Convictions, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, https://eji.org/issues/wrongful-convictions/ (last
visited Jan. 19, 2020) (“Thousands of people have been wrongly convicted across the country in a system defined
by official indifference to innocence and error.”).
12
Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 73, 74 (1999); see generally EDWIN BORCHARD & E. RUSSELL LUTZ, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT:
ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932) (arguing wrongfully convicted should be compensated similarly to tort
victims for the public wrongs they have endured).
13
See Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.
org/compensating-wrongly-convicted/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2019) (contrasting state compensation statutes).
14
Shawn Armbrust, When Money Isn’t Enough: The Case for Holistic Compensation of the Wrongfully
Convicted, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157, 160 (2004) (“[C]ompensation can be structured to best remedy the very
real physiological, psychological, and financial issues facing them upon their release.”).
9
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handle the debt that resulted from their wrongful conviction. Sources of such
debt include court fees and fines, attorney fees, restitution payments, child
support, taxes, increased debt and default created by the inability to make
payments and pay bills while in prison, and barriers to obtaining employment
after release from prison. Addressing this debt would provide a more holistic
approach to reentry for exonerees.
Perhaps the most powerful mechanism within the Code is the discharge from
debt, which provides freedom from personal liability of previous debts. The
bankruptcy system could help supplement this holistic approach by providing an
expedited discharge of the debt that stemmed from an exoneree’s wrongful
conviction. The hardship discharge of chapter 13 of the Code is explicitly
reserved for the “honest but unfortunate debtor” and must be filed in good
faith.15 The hardship discharge gives relief to a debtor when: (1) the debtor is
unable to complete plan payments “due to circumstances for which the debtor
should not justly be held accountable”; (2) the value of the property distributed
under the plan must not be less than the value distributed under a hypothetical
chapter 7 liquidation; and (3) modification of the plan is “not practicable.”16 The
debtor who receives the hardship discharge can reenter the economy without the
former burden of debt.
The wrongfully convicted should satisfy these requirements. First, exonerees
are victims of circumstances that are beyond their control and are the epitome of
“honest but unfortunate” people, as they have served time and lost years of
freedom due to a failure of the criminal legal system.17 Wrongful conviction is
tragic; “[a]mong the most shocking of . . . injuries and most glaring of injustices
are erroneous criminal convictions of innocent people.”18 Second, because it is
unlikely that an exoneree’s bankruptcy estate will contain property of high value,
creditors would be unlikely to receive more value under the liquidation
provisions of chapter 7. Third, due to the many challenges that the wrongfully

15

11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2019). The Supreme Court has also recognized this principle:
This purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being of public as
well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for
distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and
a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing
debt.

Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citations omitted).
16
Alan M. Ahart, Whether to Grant a Hardship Discharge in Chapter 13, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 559, 562–
63 (2013).
17
Hunt, 292 U.S. at 244 (1934) (citations omitted).
18
BORCHARD & LUTZ, supra note 12.
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convicted face, modifying the plan would not be practicable. Thus, an exoneree
should meet the requirements of the hardship discharge.
Allowing expedited hardship discharges to exonerees under chapter 13
would align with the long-purported mission of the bankruptcy system: to
provide a fresh start to the “honest but unfortunate debtor.” Moreover, if reentry
programs provided access to bankruptcy attorneys, some of the financial burdens
of the wrongfully convicted could be alleviated. By helping exonerees
reintegrate into the economy, the bankruptcy system could supplement holistic
approaches to reentry. In doing so, society could begin to relieve the enormous
debt that is owed to the victims of wrongful conviction.
Part I of this Comment examines wrongful conviction and the need for a
more robust approach to the financial component of reentry. It does so by
providing a background on the history of wrongful conviction in the United
States, exploring how reentry systems currently function, and discussing how an
exoneree and his family members might accumulate debt while in prison and
upon release. Part II scrutinizes the existing financial mechanisms that are
available to compensate the wrongfully convicted in other areas of law. Part III
then turns to the bankruptcy system. After first providing a primer on how the
bankruptcy system functions, it delves into the requirements of the chapter 13
hardship discharge. Finally, Part IV proposes how to incorporate relief for
exonerees into the bankruptcy system. It examines the benefits of discharging
the debts of exonerees, considering both the benefit to the exoneree and the
bankruptcy system. Part IV also responds to the implications and potential
criticisms of granting exonerees hardship discharges.
I.

WRONGFUL CONVICTION

This Section explores the history of wrongful conviction, examining both
the past studies of wrongful conviction and the potential causes of wrongful
conviction. Next, it considers the current landscape of reentry programs, the
exclusion of exonerees from these programs, and the limited number of reentry
programs that are available to exonerees. It concludes by considering the debt
exonerees accumulate as a result of their wrongful conviction.
A. Background Facts on Wrongful Conviction
To fully understand the complexity and necessity of providing meaningful
and holistic assistance to exonerees, it is important to first understand the
backdrop of this issue. Determining the causes of wrongful convictions is
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complex, and thus determining who bears the burden of remedying the effects
of wrongful conviction is complicated. “[A] mistake has been made, whether in
good faith or bad, and the question arises, who should bear the loss, the hapless
victim alone or the community.”19 This complexity, however, does not relieve
society of determining an effective way to aid those most significantly impacted
by wrongful conviction.20
The United States criminal legal system has a history of wrongful
conviction, which has long been studied.21 Yet these studies have not necessarily
led to a system that helps remedy the wrongs that stem from wrongful
conviction. In 1932, Edwin Borchard suggested:
[I]t seems strange that so little attention has been given to one of the
most flagrant of all publicly imposed wrongs—the plight of the
innocent victim of unjust conviction in criminal cases. Perhaps the
indifference is attributable to the belief that such occurrences are too
rare to justify public concern.22

Since Borchard made these remarks, the number of exonerations has
dramatically increased as society’s ability to identify wrongful conviction has
increased.
The number of exonerations has risen as DNA testing has been refined,
making the issue of wrongful conviction impossible to ignore.23 Of the 2,678
exonerations that have occurred in the United States since 1989, 1,465 (54.7%)
of those exonerations have occurred in this decade.24 Likewise, the research into
the causes of wrongful conviction, and the recognition of the complexity of these
causes, has increased.25 Wrongful convictions result from a “confluence of
19

BORCHARD & LUTZ, supra note 12, at 376–77.
See Meggan Smith, Have We Abandoned the Innocent? Society’s Debt to the Wrongly Convicted, 2
CRIM. L. BRIEF 3, 12 (2006) (“The fact that it is impossible to fully compensate an individual for the loss of
years of his freedom does not absolve society of its duty to rectify the injustice inflicted on exonerees to the
extent feasible.”).
21
See, e.g., BORCHARD & LUTZ, supra note 12 (conducting a survey of sixty-five cases of wrongful
conviction in 1932 in an effort to refute the misconception that wrongful convictions never happen or are a
“physical impossibility.”).
22
BORCHARD & LUTZ, supra note 12.
23
Armbrust, supra note 14, at 181.
24
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.
aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
25
Professor Findley and Professor Scott have performed groundbreaking work in this area, finding:
20

Literally hundreds of additional exonerations in the last fifteen years alone have been based on
evidence other than DNA . . . These exonerations have challenged the traditional assumption that
the criminal justice system does all it can to accurately determine guilt, and that erroneous
conviction of the innocent is, as the Supreme Court has assumed, ‘extremely rare.’ Further, they
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factors,” making it difficult to identify an exclusively responsible party.26 Racial
bias is pervasive in wrongful conviction, reflecting the systemic racism that fuels
our criminal legal system.27 Additional contributing factors include eyewitness
misidentification, false confessions, forensic science error or fraud,
governmental misconduct, or inadequate defense counsel.28 “Tunnel vision” can
also lead prosecutors and investigators to become so focused on one theory of
the case that they might, consciously or unconsciously, begin to ignore evidence
that points to another theory of the case.29 Yet scholars have suggested that “a
canonical list of factors” is limiting and might create “a stagnation” that slows
“needed action to improve justice processes that generate inaccurate verdicts.”30
Wrongful convictions wreak havoc on everyone: the exonerees, the victims
of the crimes for which the exonerees were convicted, the families of the victims,
the families of the wrongfully convicted, and society at large.31 The longest
have opened a window for scholarly and institutional inquiry into the causes of wrongful
convictions and the reforms that might prevent such miscarriages of justice in the future.
Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS.
L. REV. 291, 291–92 (2006).
26
Stephanie Roberts Hartung, The Confluence of Factors Doctrine: A Holistic Approach to Wrongful
Convictions, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 369, 370 (2018) (citation omitted).
27
See, e.g., Race and Wrongful Conviction, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Mar. 7, 2017),
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Race_and_Wrongful_Convictions.pdf (showing “innocent
black people are about seven times more likely to be convicted of murder than innocent white people”, a black
person serving time for sexual assault is three-and-a-half times more likely to be innocent than a white person,
and an innocent black person are about twelve times more likely to be convicted of a drug crime than a white
person.). See generally Harvey Gee, Eyewitness Testimony and Cross-Racial Identification, 35 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 835, 838–39 (2001) (reviewing ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1996)).
28
Hartung, supra note 26, at 370–71.
29
Professor Findley and Professor Scott’s research indicates that this effect can extend beyond just the
prosecutors:
This process leads investigators, prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers alike to focus on a
particular conclusion and then filter all evidence in a case through the lens provided by that
conclusion. Through that filter, all information supporting the adopted conclusion is elevated in
significance, viewed as consistent with the other evidence, and deemed relevant and probative.
Evidence inconsistent with the chosen theory is easily overlooked or dismissed as irrelevant,
incredible, or unreliable.
Findley & Scott, supra note 25, at 292.
30
Marvin Zalman & Matthew Larson, Elephants in the Station House: Serial Crimes, Wrongful
Convictions, and Expanding Wrongful Conviction Analysis to Include Police Investigation, 79 ALB. L. REV. 941,
946, 952 (2015) (quoting Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 186
(2008)).
31
Wrongful conviction not only has a drastic effect on those who are wrongfully convicted, but also
seriously affects the victims of the crimes for which the exonerees were convicted. SERI IRAZOLA ET AL., STUDY
OF VICTIM EXPERIENCES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTION, at iii (2013); Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One
Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions after a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825,
836 (2010).
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reported amount of time spent wrongfully incarcerated is forty-five years.32 The
National Registry of Exonerations estimates that exonerees have lost a total of
24,167 years as a result of wrongful incarceration.33 This lapse of time represents
time spent away from families, time that could have been spent as a productive
member of society, and time that a crime victim thought his or her attacker was
imprisoned. Additionally, studies indicate that incarceration can have a drastic
effect on one’s life expectancy.34 On a larger scale, mass incarceration has
stunted the average life expectancy in the United States as compared to other
developed countries.35
Time in prison affects every aspect of one’s life. A wrongfully convicted
person’s struggle is not remedied solely by the fact that he has been exonerated.
At a minimum, society should provide meaningful assistance to exonerees once
they reenter society.
B. Current Reentry Programs
After exonerees are released from prison, the failure of the criminal legal
system continues to disrupt their lives. This disruption is immediately evident,
as exonerees often do not have access to the already lackluster reentry programs
available to people exiting prison. Many jurisdictions attempt to provide former
offenders with a fresh start through the aid of various reentry programs, with the
aim of deterring crime and reducing recidivism.36 Reentry programs were
developed to create a bridge between leaving prison and reentering society.37
32
Richard Phillips was wrongfully convicted of murder in 1972 at twenty-five years old. He was seventyone years old when his conviction was vacated, and he was released from prison in 2017. Case Description:
Richard Phillips, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
browse.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
33
See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
34
Emily Widra, Incarceration Shortens Life Expectancy, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 26, 2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/06/26/life_expectancy/.
35
Id.
36
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY (2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2013/08/12/smart-on-crime.pdf;
Reentry Services Directory, NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR., https://csgjusticecenter.org/nrrc/reentry-servicesdirectory/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2019).
37
Professor Jonson and Professor Cullen have discussed reentry programs as part of the larger movement
to facilitate a successful transition from prison to society:

A key feature of the reentry movement is its focus on developing programs to facilitate the
successful return of prisoners to the community. This emphasis is important because it ties reentry
to the rehabilitative ideal. Implicit in the very idea of programming—whether conducted inside
or outside the prison—is that offenders face personal and situational risks that, if left unaddressed,
will likely lead them back into crime. Reentering prisoners are thus seen as being at risk for
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These programs can be court-mandated or can be sought by the individual in
need of services.38 Reentry programs attempt to aid formerly incarcerated
individuals by helping them secure employment, find housing, and gain access
to educational tools that will help them succeed upon reentry.39 Yet reentry
programs are far from successful because the transition from prison to society
presents challenging barriers.40 In response to the high rate of recidivism, critics
are calling for reentry programs to provide meaningful assistance by “tailor[ing]
their services in order to address the unique needs of the populations they
serve.”41
To make matters worse, exonerees are not always able to receive assistance
from reentry programs. Many of these programs are available to parolees, but
because exonerees are not parolees, they do not qualify for these programs.42
Thus, most exonerees are left without any guaranteed assistance during their
reentry to society. And while parolees and exonerees share many reentry needs,
exonerees have an additional set of needs that stem directly from their wrongful
incarceration.43 Just as reentry needs vary amongst parolees, reentry needs vary
amongst exonerees. These needs depend on factors such as whether the person
was exonerated before or after their release from prison, the length of wrongful
incarceration, whether the exoneree has support from family and friends, and
concerns regarding health and financial status.44 Thus, exonerees face numerous
obstacles to reentering the society from which they were wrongfully removed,
and these obstacles must be addressed on an individual basis.45
recidivating—but not destined to this fate. The challenge is thus to develop programs that work—
which are effective and evidence based.
Cheryl Lero Jonson & Francis T. Cullen, Prisoner Reentry Programs, 44 CRIME & JUST. 517, 522 (2015).
38
Jeremiah Mosteller, What Makes a Reentry Program Successful?, CHARLES KOCH INST.
https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/issue-areas/criminal-justice-policing-reform/reentry-programs/ (last visited Sept.
5, 2020).
39
Id.
40
Jonson & Cullen, supra note 37, at 529; Gerald P. Lopez, How Mainstream Reformers Design
Ambitious Reentry Programs Doomed to Fail and Destined to Reinforce Targeted Mass Incarceration and
Social Control, 11 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 62 (2014).
41
PRICE-TUCKER ET AL., supra note 10, at 3; Jonson & Cullen, supra note 37, at 517.
42
The Problem, AFTER INNOCENCE, https://www.after-innocence.org/the-problem (last visited Oct. 23,
2019); see Erik Encarnacion, Backpay for Exonerees, 29 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 245, 248 (2017).
43
See Jeffrey S. Gutman, An Empirical Reexamination of State Statutory Compensation for the Wrongly
Convicted, 82 MO. L. REV. 369, 373 (2017).
44
See id.
45
Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/
compensating-wrongly-convicted/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2020) (“The punishment continues after incarceration
. . . [w]ith no money, housing, transportation, health services or insurance, and a criminal record that is rarely
cleared despite innocence, the punishment lingers long after innocence has been proven. States have a
responsibility to restore the lives of the wrongfully convicted. . . .”).
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Many steps are required to fulfill these goals and to successfully help an
exoneree after he is released from prison. The Innocence Network provides an
Exoneration Checklist, which demonstrates a number of the complicated but
necessary steps to aid an exoneree before and after their release.46 This list,
however, is only a starting point. For example, it does not address instances
where debt accumulated while an exoneree was in prison.
In addition to the minority of states that provide reentry assistance to
exonerees through statutory schemes,47 certain non-profit groups operate reentry
programs to aid the wrongfully convicted.48 For example, the Innocence Project
has a social work department that begins working with exonerees before they
are released from prison.49 This program acknowledges the vast array of services
needed for exonerees by “locating birth certificates and social security
numbers[,] finding family members, securing housing or arranging for critical
medical and psychological treatment.”50 While such programs provide services
to some exonerees, there are still many exonerees left without assistance.
By failing to provide holistic reentry services to the wrongfully convicted,
society perpetuates the error and harm that has already been inflicted on
exonerees. To provide exonerees with a fresh start to a life that was derailed by
the failure of the criminal legal system, a more holistic and individualized
approach to reentry should be taken and provided to all exonerees. One aspect
of that holistic approach could be to coordinate access to bankruptcy attorneys,
who would consider and address the debt that results from wrongful conviction.

46
Prior to release from prison or exoneration, the list recommends: (1) assess the exoneree’s social
support and living situation by determining what he wants to do, where he wants to live, and what contacts can
be made to support him; (2) locate and obtain the exoneree’s personal documentation, including, if available, his
prison ID, Social Security Card, birth certificate, State ID or driver’s license, and documentation of Veteran
status. If these items are not available, help the client and his family members apply for them; and (3) assess the
client’s health needs, including physical health, mental health, and determining any necessary medication or
significant physical or mental health history. Exoneration Checklist, INNOCENCE NETWORK, https://
innocencenetwork.org/exoneration-checklist/, (last visited Sept. 5, 2020). Following release or exoneration, the
list recommends: (1) contacting continuing contact with any available support network; determining what public
benefits the exoneree is eligible for, including food stamps, cash assistance, Medicaid, Veterans Benefits, or
Supplemental Security Insurance; and (3) assessing what legal assistance the client needs. Id.
47
See infra Section II(A).
48
See, e.g., About Section, AFTER INNOCENCE, https://www.after-innocence.org/aboutai (last visited
Sept. 5, 2020) (providing “efficient re-entry assistance for America’s wrongfully convicted, and advocates with
exonerees for laws that provide them with meaningful compensation and effective re-entry support.”).
49
Support the Exonerated, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/Support/ (last visited
Sept. 5, 2020).
50
Id.
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C. Measuring an Exoneree’s Debt
There are many reasons why an exoneree might be in debt upon release from
prison, including: lost income and work experience, domestic support
obligations, education costs, family expenses, legal fees, court fees and fines,
taxes, and barriers to obtaining employment after release from prison. These
factors should not only be considered for the exoneree as an individual but also
with respect to his family members. These potential debts are discussed in this
Section.
1. Debt Due to Time in Prison
It is common for incarcerated individuals to accrue debt while serving time.
The exoneree would not have had the opportunity to gain meaningful income
while wrongfully incarcerated due to the nature of wages paid to those working
a prison job. Further, he lost the opportunity to pay off the debt that may have
accumulated prior to incarceration. Wages for employment in prisons are
woefully below the minimum wage outside of prison and are typically capped
by a maximum daily wage.51 Some states do not pay prisoners for work on
regular prison jobs.52 Other states deduct expenses from wages, leaving some
people with half of an already minimal paycheck.53 This lack of meaningful
income is compounded by the fact that, in forty-nine states, incarcerated
individuals must pay for the costs of their incarceration—commonly referred to
as “pay to stay” debt.54 Lack of employment while incarcerated is another major
contributing factor to the accrual of debt.
51
Compare Prison Wages, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/
wages/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2020) (“The average of minimum daily wages paid to incarcerated workers for nonindustry prison jobs is now 86 cents . . . The average maximum daily wage for the same prison job had declined
. . . to $3.45 today.”), and Prison Wage Policies, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/wage_policies.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2020) (providing a detailed report of prison wages according to
each state), with NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS., STATE MINIMUM WAGES, 2019 MINIMUM WAGE BY STATE,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-minimum-wage-chart.aspx#:~:targetText=The%20
Georgia%20state%20minimum%20wage,state%20minimum%20wage%20of%20%245.15 (last visited Sept. 5,
2020).
52
See Prison Wages, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/04/10/wages/
(last visited Sept. 5, 2020) (showing Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, and Texas do not pay regular prison
job workers).
53
Id. (providing the example of Massachusetts, which deducts at least half of every paycheck, with the
other half going to a savings account to pay costs such as court fines and fees and victim witness assessments.).
54
For example, Florida has implemented a “pay to stay” scheme in its prison system:

The state of Florida, which pays inmate workers a maximum of $0.55 per hour, billed former
inmate Dee Taylor $55,000 for his three-year sentence. He would have had to work 100,000
hours, or over 11 years nonstop, at a prison wage to pay for his three year incarceration. Even as
a free man working at Florida’s minimum wage of $8.25, he would have to work more than 6,666
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An additional source of debt could stem from domestic support obligations.
The exoneree might also owe taxes or child support if he has children.55 Studies
measuring the average amount of child support owed by incarcerated individuals
demonstrate that these payments can be enormous.56
Another likely source of debt is an exoneree’s attorney’s fees.57 These fees
might extend to lawyers who provided advocacy prior to the exoneration. In a
study of the first 250 DNA exonerations, researchers found that only 14% of
these factually innocent people initially won a reversal on direct appeal.58 Court
costs and fees can also accumulate to extremely high amounts.59 In other words,
exonerations involve long legal battles, which can be incredibly expensive and
can create a substantial source of debt.
Debt could also stem from being a parolee. If the exoneree was released from
prison after serving a full sentence and was placed on parole before being
exonerated, he will have parole fees and fines.60 Parole might also include travel,
curfews that limit the exoneree’s ability to work certain hours, paying for
supervision and drug and alcohol testing, and securing approved housing.61 The
cost of parole or other court supervision can be enormously high, and debt
hours―more than three regular work years―and not spend a penny on anything else to pay it
back. These debts are impossible for the even hardest-working people to pay off.
Chandra Bozelko & Ryan Lo, You’ve Served Your Time. Now Here’s Your Bill, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 16,
2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/opinion-prison-strike-labor-criminal-justice_n_5b9bf1a1e4b013b0977
a7d74.
55
Daniel S. Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Burden of Proof in Wrongful Conviction
Claims Under State Compensation Statutes, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 123, 130 (2010).
56
Mona Lewandoski, Barred from Bankruptcy: Recently Incarcerated Debtors in and Outside
Bankruptcy, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 199 (2010) (citations omitted) (“One study estimated that
thirty-two percent of Ohio inmates had child support obligations, as did seventeen percent of Illinois inmates
and sixteen percent of Texas inmates. Studies of Colorado and Massachusetts inmates placed the average total
child support debt at release around $16,000.”).
57
Calvin Willis’s fees from trial and post-conviction proceedings totaled over $14,000. Calvin Willis:
Thank God For DNA, in SURVIVING JUSTICE: AMERICA’S WRONGFULLY CONVICTED AND EXONERATED 141
(Lola Vollen & Dave Eggers, eds., Verso ed. 2017) (discussing an interview with Calvin Willis that was
conducted by editor Lola Vollen and foreword author Scott Turow); Kahn, supra note 55, at 129.
58
Hartung, supra note 26, at 374 n. 32 (“appellate or postconviction courts reversed 14% of exonerees’
convictions, or 9% if one excludes capital cases.”) (quoting Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 55, 98 (2008)).
59
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 198 (citations omitted).
60
REBEKAH DILLER, JUDITH GREENE & MICHELLE JACOBS, MARYLAND’S PAROLE SUPERVISION FEE: A
BARRIER TO REENTRY 12 (2009), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_
Maryland%27s-Parole-Supervision-Fee.pdf (For example, in Maryland, “[t]he mean amount [of supervision
fees] was $743 and the median was $560. . . . [I]t is not surprising that nine out of ten people on parole will have
failed to pay the full amount of supervision fee debt when they exit the parole system.” Further, a 17% charge
for collection is applied when a debt is transferred at the end of a parolee’s parole term.).
61
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 225 (citations omitted).
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resulting from this court supervision should be considered in an exoneree’s
bankruptcy petition.
Another consideration is the cost of education. If the exoneree chose to
pursue an education before or while in prison, he might have accumulated
student loans. Further, his family members might have decided to pursue an
education during the wrongful incarceration. The exoneree was denied the
opportunity to assist with the cost of this education, resulting in further debt.
Beyond the exoneree’s personal debt is the consideration of his family
members and the debts that they might have accrued while he was in prison.
Families often pay for the cost of making phone calls and visits to and from
prison, as well as contributing to the commissary accounts of their loved ones.62
The family may have also spent thousands of dollars on representation that did
not prevent the wrongful conviction.63 For example, Wilton Dedge spent twentytwo years in prison.64 His parents used their retirement fund and took out a
second mortgage to pay for his attorney’s fees.65 Vincent Moto spent nine years
in prison before he was exonerated.66 His mother spent $160,000 on legal fees.67
Mr. Moto was exonerated in Pennsylvania, which does not yet have a
compensation statute, leaving him without any aid to help his mother pay the
fees after exoneration.68 Due to their time in prison and the subsequent efforts
that were made to obtain exoneration, exonerees and their families are left in
financial distress. This financial distress is compounded by the lack of resources
provided to exonerees when they leave prison.
2. Debt Due to Barriers Faced Upon Release from Prison
Exonerees also accrue debt due to the barriers they face once they are
released from prison. While in prison, exonerees have missed the chance to

62
Following the Money of Mass Incarceration, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/money.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2020) (estimating that families spend $2.9 billion a year on commissary
accounts and phone calls.).
63
See, e.g., SURVIVING JUSTICE: AMERICA’S WRONGFULLY CONVICTED AND EXONERATED 141–57 (Lola
Vollen & Dave Eggers, eds., Verso ed. 2017); see also Kahn, supra note 55, at 129.
64
Wilton Dedge, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/wilton-dedge/ (last
visited Oct. 23, 2019).
65
Audrey D. Koehler, Comment, Exonerated, Free, and Forgotten: How States Continue to Punish the
Wrongfully Convicted Through Procedural Hoops and Inadequate Compensation, 58 WASHBURN L.J. 493, 489–
99 (2019).
66
Vincent Moto, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/vincent-moto/ (last
visited Oct. 23, 2019).
67
Koehler, supra note 65, at 499.
68
Koehler, supra note 65, at 499.
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develop professionally, to build skills, and to successfully seek employment
with robust experience on their resume. 47% of exonerees were twenty-five
years old or younger at the time of their conviction.69 Of those 1,267 exonerees,
the average amount of time between conviction and exoneration was thirteen
years.70 Access to education within prisons has proven to be unsuccessful and
unhelpful to gaining employment upon release from prison.71 Thus, exonerees—
whose young adult lives were spent in prison—will need access to holistic
training and educational programs once they are released.72
Upon release from prison, exonerees face many barriers, including securing
healthcare, housing, and employment.73 The struggles stemming from these
barriers are exacerbated by the scant support given to exonerees once released
from incarceration. These barriers will likely impair an exoneree’s ability to
climb out of the debt he accumulated while in prison.74 An exoneree might also
face a range of mental health issues that stem from the trauma he endured while
incarcerated.75 The debts that stem from these issues should be discharged, as
they resulted from wrongful conviction.
II. EXISTING FINANCIAL MECHANISMS TO RESPOND TO WRONGFUL
CONVICTION
It has long been argued that exonerees should be granted indemnification for
their wrongful incarceration.76 Currently, financial remedies provided to

69
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.
aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
70
Id.
71
On the topic of education, Lewandowski notes:

Prison education may not significantly improve employment prospects or income. One study
found that a prison GED brought a modest earnings premium for only four years after release. A
Florida study found little evidence of a prison GED providing any employment benefit, and then
only for minority offenders, and an Ohio study found that a prison GED had “no effect” on the
probability of employment.
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 221 (citations omitted).
72
Koehler, supra note 65, at 497.
73
INNOCENCE PROJECT, MAKING UP FOR LOST TIME: WHAT THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED ENDURE AND
HOW TO PROVIDE FAIR COMPENSATION 8–10, https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
innocence_project_compensation_report-6.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).
74
Koehler, supra note 65, at 498.
75
Leslie Scott, “It Never, Ever Ends”: The Psychological Impact of Wrongful Conviction, 5 CRIM. L.
BRIEF 10 (2010).
76
These discussions have been taking place since at least 1932. Bochard and Lutz wrote in their seminal
book:
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exonerees are obtained through (a) a state’s compensation statute; (b) a private
compensation bill; or (c) civil lawsuits. Only thirty-five states, the District of
Columbia, and the federal government offer compensation schemes.77 The
remaining fifteen states do not have compensation statutes, leaving exonerees
without remedy unless they successfully petition the state legislature for a
private compensation bill, file a section 1983 civil rights claim, or file a
common-law tort claim.78 These three methods of obtaining compensation are
not a reliable or adequate form of providing indemnification to the wrongfully
convicted. This Section examines the three financial mechanisms that are
available to purportedly provide remedies to the wrongfully convicted.
A. Compensation Statutes
States with statutory schemes provide general and limited remedies for
wrongful incarceration.79 Some existing statutory schemes have been found to
“all but guarantee” that exonerees “have no realistic opportunity to prove they
are deserving of refunds.”80 The amount of money provided by compensation
statutes varies wildly by state and can vary within each state.81 Many statutes
[w]hen . . . by a misguided or mistaken operation of the governmental machine there is a
miscarriage of justice and the helpless innocent is actually convicted, the public conscience is
and ought to be revolted and dismayed. The least the community can do to repair the irreparable,
is to appease the public conscience by making such restitution as it can by indemnity.
BORCHARD & LUTZ, supra note 12, at 392.
77
Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/
compensating-wrongly-convicted/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).
78
The fifteen states are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Id. As of
August 31, 2020, 256 exonerations have taken place in these states. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
79
But, as Professor Gutman notes, the existing remedies are incomplete and insufficient:
Such statutes largely ignore the nature, severity, and variation of injuries suffered while
incarcerated; fail to account for post-release damages, such as ongoing psychological and medical
harms; and overlook the pressing needs many exonerees have for social, vocational, medical, and
educational services following what is often years of wrongful incarceration. In sum, most of
these statutes reflect a begrudging rather than a restorative approach to remedying the harm done
to the wrongly convicted.
Gutman, supra note 43, at 371–72.
80
Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1260 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring). The Exoneration Act of
Colorado, and its requirement that defendants prove their innocence by clear and convincing evidence a second
time in order to obtain the refund of fees paid pursuant to their wrongful conviction, violates due process. Id. at
1255. Justice Alito also questioned why the defendant should not be compensated for “all the adverse economic
consequences of the wrongful conviction . . . [s]uch as attorney’s fees, lost income, and damage to reputation.”
Id. at 1261 (Alito, J. concurring).
81
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.
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place demanding burdens on the exonerees or cap the amount of award that can
be given.82 This Section considers the ineffectiveness of compensation statutes
in providing meaningful remedies to the wrongfully convicted.
It is first helpful to examine the vast differences in compensation statutes
across states.83 While some states provide more comprehensive models of
compensation, others fall woefully behind. Texas is one of the five states with
the most exonerated individuals, with 389 exonerations thus far.84 Texas has
vastly improved its compensation scheme since the initial compensation
legislation was passed in 1965.85
This improvement is found in the Tim Cole Act, which was passed after the
posthumous exoneration of Timothy Cole. In 1986, Mr. Cole was convicted and
sentenced to twenty-five years for a rape he did not commit.86 Although the
actual perpetrator wrote to police and prosecutors to confess in 1995, these
letters were ignored.87 Mr. Cole died in prison in 1999.88 The court made four
findings when it posthumously exonerated Mr. Cole in 2009, including that Mr.
Cole would not have died in prison if the criminal legal system had not failed
him.89 When Texas passed the Tim Cole Act, compensation for exonerees was
increased from $50,000 to $80,000 for every year spent in prison.90 In the event
of a posthumous exoneration, the Act also extends compensation, college
tuition, and funds for personal and financial planning to the exoneree’s heirs and
legal representatives.91
While this compensation scheme offers more compensation to exonerees
than other schemes, it is far from perfect. For example, Texas does not provide

aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).
82
Id.
83
Newton N. Knowles, Exonerated, but Not Free: The Prolonged Struggle for a Second Chance at a
Stolen Life, 12 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 235, 259 (2015) (“[T]he lack of uniformity among the fifty
states does little to enhance the integrity of our criminal justice system.”).
84
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.
aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2020) (the other states in the top five are Illinois, New York, California, and Michigan).
These states account for 49% of exonerations. Id.
85
Id.; John Shaw, Comment, Exoneration and the Road to Compensation: The Tim Cole Act and
Comprehensive Compensation for Persons Wrongfully Imprisoned, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 593, 604–10
(2011).
86
Timothy Cole, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/timothy-cole/ (last
visited Aug. 26, 2020).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Shaw, supra note 85, at 600–01.
90
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 103.052 (West 2011).
91
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 103.001(c) (West 2011).
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a cap on attorney’s fees for the wrongfully convicted.92 One Texas attorney, who
represented thirteen wrongfully convicted clients, claimed he was owed $8
million from his clients.93 While Texas at least recognized the egregious error
made during Mr. Cole’s case, there is significant room for improvement, such
as providing reentry assistance for those who are still living when exonerated.
On the other end of the spectrum is New Hampshire, the state with both the
lowest number of exonerations and the lowest cap on compensation.94 New
Hampshire has had two exonerations and caps compensation for exonerees at
$20,000.95 Does New Hampshire have such a low compensation cap because of
the few exonerations that it has had? Or perhaps, do states rely on cases that are
similarly horrific to Mr. Cole’s case to find the motivation to provide a just and
adequate compensation scheme to exonerees?
Only a few states provide reentry assistance to exonerees through statutory
schemes.96 Further, rather than guaranteeing certain services, some of these
statutes provide limited assistance by capping the amount of compensation that
can be directed to obtain reentry services.97 Instead, many exonerees are left to
locate non-profits that provide reentry assistance.98
To make matters worse, in states where compensation is capped, the
wrongfully convicted are not consistently or equitably compensated.99 In a study
92
Shaw, supra note 85, at 614; but see IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 8241 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (LexisNexis 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405
(LexisNexis 2008).
93
Shaw, supra note 85, at 614.
94
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.
aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2020); Compensation Statutes: A National Overview, NAT’L REGISTRY OF
EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/CompensationByState_
InnocenceProject.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).
95
NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx
(last visited Oct. 14, 2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541-B:14 (LexisNexis 2010).
96
Massachusetts and Illinois are among a small number of states who provide post-exoneration support
services along with their monetary compensation schemes. Knowles, supra note 83, at 403; see, e.g., MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258D, § 5 (West 2018) (“The court may include, as part of its judgment against the
commonwealth, an order requiring the commonwealth to provide the claimant with services that are reasonable
and necessary to address any deficiencies in the individual’s physical and emotional condition”); see also VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5574 (West 2015) (“[C]ompensation for any reasonable reintegrative services and mental
and physical health care costs incurred by the claimant for the time period between his or her release from
mistaken incarceration and the date of the award.”).
97
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2019) (providing up to $80,000 in “compensation for the loss of life
opportunities resulting from the time spent incarcerated,” including expenses relating to job skills training,
education, housing, and any other reasonable services needed).
98
See supra Section I(B).
99
Gutman, supra note 43, at 403 (“States with compensation caps produce unjustifiable inequalities
among exonerees within the state.”).
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of state statutory compensation, Professor Jeffrey Gutman divided different
statutes into three categories: (1) statutes that provide a daily or annual cap on
compensation without providing an overall cap on compensation; (2) statutes
that provide a daily or annual cap on compensation with an overall cap on
compensation; and (3) an overall cap on damages.100 Gutman critiques each
category: Category 1 and 2 “depersonalize” the process, “presuming that all
wrongfully incarcerated persons suffer equally.”101 By providing a cap on total
compensation, Category 2 “penalize[s] those incarcerated the longest.”102 If their
total compensation is less than it would have been without the cap, they are
essentially left without compensation for their later years in prison.103 Similarly,
in Category 3, those who have served lengthy sentences may not be compensated
for their later years in prison due to the total cap.104
A further issue with state statutory compensation schemes is the burden they
place on exonerees. Some states require the exoneree to prove that he did not
engage in any misconduct that contributed to his prosecution.105 In some states,
the exoneree must receive a pardon from the governor, which is a procedural
step that is not required for a person to be exonerated by law.106 Other states
require the exoneree to have been exonerated by DNA evidence.107 This raises
obvious issues in cases where there was no DNA evidence, the DNA evidence
was destroyed or missing, or the case predated DNA testing and did not involve
the collection of samples for testing.108 Further, in Florida, exonerees with felony
convictions prior to their wrongful conviction are ineligible to receive
compensation through the statutory compensation scheme.109 For example,

100
101
102
103
104

Gutman, supra note 43, at 401–02.
Gutman, supra note 43, at 402.
Gutman, supra note 43, at 401–02.
Gutman, supra note 43, at 402.
Professor Gutman discusses the way Illinois implements this approach:
Illinois, with the third-highest number of exonerees on the Registry . . . provides capped amounts
for 0-5 years, 5-14 years, and over 14 years of incarceration . . . One 2010 exoneree received
$85,350 for a 1.2-year wrongful incarceration, which exceeds $70,000 per year. Another man
exonerated the same year after 23.1 years of wrongful imprisonment was awarded $199,500, or
just over $8600 per year.

Gutman, supra note 43, at 402–03 (citations omitted).
105
Gutman, supra note 43, at 371 (citing D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-422(2) (West 2017); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2-702(d) (LexisNexis 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3(d) (West 2013); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(5)(d)
(McKinney 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.10B (2017)).
106
Gutman, supra note 43, at 371 n. 8 (Maine, Maryland, North Carolina, and Tennessee).
107
Gutman, supra note 43, at 371 n. 8 (Missouri and Montana).
108
Gutman, supra note 43, at 371.
109
Gutman, supra note 43, at 371.
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Derrick Williams served eighteen years after he was convicted in Florida.110
When Mr. Williams was released from his wrongful incarceration wearing only
a prison uniform, he was ineligible to receive compensation due to a prior
nonviolent felony conviction.111
It is incredibly unjust that someone who has been victimized by the criminal
legal system should be expected to have lived a life free of mistakes prior to their
wrongful conviction. Overall, the route to obtaining just compensation through
state statutes is not a reliable, equitable, or just form of compensation to the
wrongfully convicted.
B. Private Compensation Bills
The second avenue to receiving compensation is through a private bill. The
exoneree must lobby the state legislature to pass a private bill in order to receive
compensation from the state treasury.112 Yet private bills present an unreliable,
inequitable, and inadequate form of compensation.113
First, in many states where statutory compensation schemes do not exist,
private bills are barred and therefore unavailable to exonerees.114 Second, in
states that have allowed private compensation bills, the amount paid to
exonerees is not proportional to the length of time the exonerees spent in prison.
For example, in Georgia, Clarence Harrison received $1 million from a private
bill after serving nearly eighteen years in prison.115 John Jerome White, who
served more than twenty-two years, received $500,000 from a private bill.116

110
Derrick Williams, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/derrick-williams/
(last visited Jan. 22, 2019).
111
Koehler, supra note 65, at 496; see also Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 223 (“About two-thirds of
corrections departments release inmates with their personal savings and cash known as ‘gate money,’ but often
no more than $200.”) (citation omitted).
112
Deborah Mostaghel, Wrongfully Incarcerated, Randomly Compensated—How to Fund WrongfulConviction Compensation Statutes, 44 IND. L. REV. 503, 510 (2011) (quoting Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim
Jacket? A Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 665 (2002)).
113
See Bernhard, supra note 12, at 94 (“Ultimately, the private bill remedy is an inadequate solution for
individuals who have been wrongfully convicted.”).
114
See, e.g., Gutman, supra note 43, at 372 n. 12.
115
Clarence Harrison, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3286#:~:text=Harrison%20was%20released%20from%20custody,
%241%20million%20in%20state%20compensation (last visited Sept. 12, 2020) (While Mr. Harrison received
significantly more than other Georgia exonerees, this Comment will later discuss how his award did not provide
with the tools to successfully reenter the economy. See infra Section IV(B)(ii).).
116
John Jerome White, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3735#:~:text=After%20White%20was%20exonerated%2C%20pros
ecutors,%24500%2C000%20in%20compensation%20to%20White (last visited Sept. 12, 2020).
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Third, the process relies on the political makeup of the legislature rather than
on the legal system.117 The exoneree must find a legislator who is not only
willing to introduce the bill but also willing to find support in both houses.118
Without a legislator who is well-connected and willing to fight for the bill,
exonerees have a very slim chance of obtaining compensation through this
avenue.119 For example, also in Georgia, Sam Scott and Doug Echols did not
receive compensation following their exoneration despite locating a legislator to
lobby for them.120 The district attorney who initially convicted the men wrote to
the legislature to oppose the private bills, alleging that the vacatur of their
convictions did not establish their innocence.121 Although DNA exonerated
them, Mr. Scott and Mr. Echols never received compensation, and their criminal
records were never expunged.122 Further, the district attorney was granted
qualified immunity for his false statements to the state legislature.123
Fourth, and finally, the struggle to obtain compensation does not stop once
the private bill has passed. For example, in one case, although two exonerees
successfully passed a private bill, the process of actually obtaining the
compensation spanned decades.124 Overall, the process of obtaining a private
bill is too challenging to be a reliable form of compensation. The process is
“susceptible to manipulation by the unscrupulous since the decision to vote an
award is based upon politicians’ speeches made on the floor of the congress, not
upon sworn testimony subject to cross examination at a fact-finding hearing.”125
This process takes virtually all control out of the exoneree’s hands, as he is
reliant upon the legislative body to make a decision that might ultimately be
arbitrary rather than just. In sum, private bills are unreliable due to the procedure
and politics that can slow down or even bar an exoneree from obtaining
compensation.

117
See Adele Bernhard, A Short Overview of the Statutory Remedies for the Wrongly Convicted: What
Works, What Doesn’t and Why, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 403, 408 (2009).
118
Id.
119
See Bernhard, supra note 12, at 95.
120
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Cleared by DNA, 1 Ga. Man Gets $1M, 2 Get Nothing, DESERET NEWS (July 18,
2009, 10:29 AM), https://www.deseret.com/2009/7/18/20329691/cleared-by-dna-1-ga-man-gets-1m-2-getnothing#in-this-april-11-photo-sammy-scott-right-describes-his-time-served-in-the-georgia-prison-system-athis-home-in-pooler-ga-doug-echols-left-listens-on-both-echols-and-scott-served-over-a-decade-in-prisonbefore-being-exonerated-through-dna-evidence).
121
Id.; see Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 2019).
122
Echols, 913 F.3d at 1318.
123
Echols, 913 F.3d at 1326.
124
Bernhard, supra note 12, at 95 (It took more than twenty years for two men who were wrongfully
convicted of murder and sentenced to death to receive compensation.).
125
Bernhard, supra note 12, at 95.
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C. Civil Lawsuits
The third and final method of obtaining compensation is through civil
lawsuits. Lawsuits are available for only a small number of cases, as they require
an exoneree to prove he is a victim of intentional misconduct.126 Although the
National Registry reports that police, prosecutorial, or other government official
misconduct contributed to 54% of reported wrongful convictions, many of these
actors are protected by immunity.127 Section 1983 claims are made more
complicated by the fact that there is rarely one actor who has caused a wrongful
conviction, leaving exonerees to somehow prove that “each individual defendant
deprived him of a specific constitutional right and that the deprivation of this
constitutional right, in turn, caused his injuries.”128 This is a huge hurdle to
overcome.
Even when section 1983 lawsuits are successful, they span many years.
Walter Swift, for example, spent twenty-six years in prison for a crime that he
126
Making Up for Lost Time: What the Wrongfully Convicted Endure and How to Provide Fair
Compensation, INNOCENCE PROJECT 12, https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
innocence_project_compensation_report-6.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2020) (“In most cases, there is no
intentional misconduct that caused the wrongful conviction, or at least, none that can be proven.”). See also
Teressa E. Ravenell, Cause and Conviction: The Role of Causation in § 1983 Wrongful Conviction Claims, 81
TEMP. L. REV. 689, 692–93 (2008). William O’Dell Harris was wrongfully convicted of sexual assault in West
Virginia. When the court vacated the conviction six years later, it considered a report by the American Society
of Crime Laboratory, which showed egregious misconduct on behalf of Fred Zain, the police serologist who
testified at Mr. Harris’s trial. The court stated:

The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included (1) overstating the strength of results; (2)
overstating the frequency of genetic matches on individual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting
the frequency of genetic matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items
had been tested, when only a single item had been tested; (5) reporting inconclusive results as
conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering laboratory records; (7) grouping results to create the erroneous
impression that genetic markers had been obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to report
conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report conducting additional testing to resolve
conflicting results; (10) implying a match with a suspect when testing supported only a match
with the victim; and (11) reporting scientifically impossible or improbable results.
In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 517–18 (W. Va. 1993).
Later that year, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the results of all of the blood tests
analyzed by Zain were invalid. See Court Invalidates a Decade of Blood Test Results in Criminal Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1993 at A.20, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/12/us/court-invalidates-a-decade-of-bloodtest-results-in-criminal-cases.html (This case is an example of an extremely high standard being met due to the
repeated and systematic misconduct of an actor in a case.).
127
See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
browse.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2020); see also Mark R. Brown, Correlating Municipal Liability and Official
Immunity Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 625, 630, 673 (finding that immunities may offer
municipalities, and their “attached” officials, too much protection from liability); see also Bernhard, supra note
12, at 87.
128
Ravenell, supra note 126, at 692–93.
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did not commit.129 Although he was released in 2008, he was not awarded $2.5
million until 2015.130 This amount was the result of a settlement with the City
of Detroit and was delayed due to the city’s bankruptcy.131 By the time Mr. Swift
reached this settlement, he had spent seven years since his exoneration fighting
legal battles.132 One-third of his settlement money went to his lawyers for their
efforts.133 Mr. Swift is one example of how even “successful” section 1983
lawsuits can be unhelpful due to the costly and inefficient nature of litigation.
If an exoneree wishes to bring a civil tort claim, he must know or have reason
to know of the tortious conduct, and the statute of limitations generally requires
that the exoneree file the claim within one to three years from this knowledge.134
The average amount of time between conviction and exoneration is nine years.135
Since the average time of wrongful incarceration is significantly greater than the
general requirement of the statute of limitations, it is unlikely that an exoneree
will be able to meet the requirement of filing a civil tort claim in time.
Alternatively, if the exoneree wishes to bring a malicious prosecution claim,
his claim must meet an incredibly high standard. Under the common law, an
exoneree generally must show that (1) the prosecution initiated a proceeding
against him; (2) the proceeding terminated in favor of the prosecution; (3) there
was no probable cause for the proceeding; (4) the primary purpose of the
prosecution involved malice; and (5) damage resulted from the prosecution.136
Thus, “an exonerated claimant essentially alleges that a prosecutor maliciously
brought criminal charges against [him] without probable cause and obtained a
conviction that resulted in [his] wrongful incarceration as shown by [his] later
exoneration.”137

129
Walter Swift, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3673 (last visited Sept 12, 2020).
130
Id.
131
Ed White, Detroiter Cleared of Rape Settles with City for $2.5M, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 3, 2015,
4:23 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2015/02/03/walter-swift-detroiter-clearedrape-settles-city/22811971/.
132
See id.
133
Id.
134
Bernhard, supra note 12, at 87.
135
See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/
Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2020).
136
Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and A Denim Jacket? A Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted,
36 GA. L. REV. 665, 693 (2002) (citing Dickey v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc., 286 F.2d 137, 139 (5th
Cir. 1960)).
137
Id.
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Civil lawsuits present difficult procedural and legal standards that are
compounded by the fact that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee
representation in civil proceedings.138 This leaves exonerees to navigate this
avenue to compensation with potentially no representation. Unsurprisingly, only
28% of lawsuits pursued by DNA exonerees have been successful in obtaining
compensation.139 Civil lawsuits are another inadequate mechanism to obtain just
compensation for wrongful conviction.
III. OPPORTUNITY FOR A FRESH START THROUGH THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
The financial support given to exonerees is inadequate. Although the current
methods to receive compensation are not effective, there is an existing system
that could aid exonerees in obtaining financial relief: the bankruptcy system. The
Code strives to grant a “fresh start” to the “honest but unfortunate debtor.”140
Bankruptcy provides an opportunity to aid the wrongfully convicted with the
financial difficulties they suffer as a result of their wrongful incarceration.
A. Bankruptcy Basics
To understand an exoneree’s path to relief through the bankruptcy courts, it
is important to first consider the basics of a bankruptcy proceeding. Generally,
a debtor begins the bankruptcy proceeding by filing a bankruptcy petition.141
The filing of the petition creates the bankruptcy estate.142 The petition is
accompanied by additional documents, which provide insight into the assets of
the estate, as well as what is owed by the estate.143 This includes a list of
creditors, with the amounts and nature of their claims, the source, amount, and

138
See Eve Brensike Primus, THE ILLUSORY RIGHT TO COUNSEL, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 597, 606 (2011)
(citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974)).
139
INNOCENCE PROJECT, MAKING UP FOR LOST TIME: WHAT THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED ENDURE AND
HOW TO PROVIDE FAIR COMPENSATION 4, https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
innocence_project_compensation_report-6.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2019).
140
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1991).
141
11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2019).
142
Id. § 541(a).
143
With the filing of the petition, most debtors must also file a schedule of assets and liabilities, current
income and expenditures, executory contracts and unexpired leases, and a statement of financial affairs. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 1007(b). In addition, the debtor must file a certificate of credit counseling, a copy of any debt
repayment developed through that credit counseling, if applicable, any evidence of payment from employers
received sixty days before filing, a statement of monthly net income and any anticipated increase in income or
expenses after filing, and a record of any interest the debtor has in federal or state qualified education or tuition
accounts. 11 U.S.C. § 521. The debtor will also provide the chapter 13 trustee with a copy of tax returns for the
most recent tax year or years that tax returns for prior years that had not been filed by the time the bankruptcy
case began. Id. § 521(e)(2)(A)(i).
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frequency of the debtor’s income, a list of all of the debtor’s property, and a
detailed list of the debtor’s monthly living expenses.144
Filing the bankruptcy petition not only creates the bankruptcy estate and
begins the proceedings, but also initiates the automatic stay.145 The automatic
stay is a “fundamental protection afforded by the Bankruptcy Code” that stops
collection actions outside of the bankruptcy forum against the debtor of the
estate.146
The automatic stay is designed to effect an immediate freeze of the
status quo by precluding and nullifying post-petition actions, judicial
or nonjudicial, in nonbankruptcy fora against the debtor or affecting
the property of the estate . . . [and] ensures that all claims against the
debtor will be brought in a single forum, the bankruptcy court.147

The automatic stay provides a shield to the debtor from any other action against
him, making it a very important aspect of the fresh start provided by the Code.148
Certain aspects of the filing of a bankruptcy petition need special
consideration in the case of an exoneree. For example, the automatic stay does
not apply to ongoing criminal actions involving the debtor.149 Therefore, the
automatic stay would protect an exoneree from any collection action claims,
while allowing him to pursue any ongoing proceeding related to his exoneration
or compensation.150 Another consideration is whether, if married, an exoneree
would prefer to file individually or file jointly with a spouse.151 On the other
hand, the exoneree might not wish for the inclusion of his spouse’s assets in the
valuation of the bankruptcy estate, as this would entail incorporating more assets
into the debtor’s repayment plan.152
144
145
146
147

Id. § 521.
Id. § 1302(b).
In re Wingard, 382 B.R. 892, 899 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2008) (citations omitted).
Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers’ Ass’n, 997 F.2d 581, 585 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations

omitted).
148
See Robert J. Bein, Subjectivity, Good Faith and the Expanded Chapter 13 Discharge, 70 MO. L. REV.
655, 658 (2005).
149
An exception to the automatic stay is “the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or
proceeding against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1).
150
A party can request, after notice and hearing, that the court grant relief from the automatic stay through
termination, annulment, modification, or conditioning of the stay for cause. Id. § 362(d)(1). Courts have
discretion in granting these motions. Cause, which is not defined by the Code, has been found to permit litigation
to continue in a different, more appropriate forum. In re Scarborough-St. James Corp., 535 B.R. 60, 67–68
(Bankr. D. Del. 2016).
151
Id. § 302(a).
152
If the exoneree does not wish to file a joint petition, his spouse may will not automatically be entitled
to discharge in a separate bankruptcy proceeding. See In re Elkins, 562 B.R. 685, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2016). The
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Chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 15 create different forms of bankruptcy
proceedings for different types and needs of debtors.153 Individuals are eligible
to file in chapters 7, 11, 12, 13, and 15 bankruptcy.154 This section explains why
chapter 13 would be the preferable chapter for an exoneree, and how an exoneree
would move through such a proceeding.
B. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
There are many reasons for an exoneree to file for bankruptcy under chapter
13 over the other chapters. First, “[t]he purpose of chapter 13 is to enable an
individual, under court supervision and protection, to develop and perform under
a plan for the repayment of his debts.”155 Second, chapter 13 allows debtors to
keep their property throughout the bankruptcy proceedings.156 By contrast, a
chapter 7 case requires debtors to surrender all pre-bankruptcy property.157 The
chapter 7 case divides all-pre bankruptcy property and distributes it to the
creditors in the case.158 Third, chapter 13 discharge is broader than the discharge
former spouse of a wrongfully convicted man moved to reopen her separate bankruptcy case. She argued that
the trustee of her estate should be allowed to file an amended tax return due to a change in federal law that allows
exonerees to exclude money obtained through civil damages, restitution, or other monetary award due to
wrongful conviction from their tax filings. She argued that she was entitled to this tax refund as well. The district
court stated, “[t]he bankruptcy court properly interpreted § 139F and determined that claims or suits for refund
would be futile because the Debtors are not wrongfully incarcerated individuals; therefore, they may not avail
themselves of the exclusion from gross income set forth in § 139F as a matter of law.” Id.
153
11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (Chapter 7 provides for liquidation proceedings. Chapter 7 can be filed for by
individuals and corporations and is the most common type of bankruptcy case); id. §§ 901–946 (Municipalities
and other governmental entities file for chapter 9 bankruptcy); id. §§ 1101–1174 (Chapter 11 proceedings are
reorganization proceedings and are typically pursued by legal entities, not individuals); id. §§ 1201–1232
(Chapter 12 is a debtor who is a family farmer or fisherman with a regular income); id. §§ 1301–1330 (Chapter
13 allows for the adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income); id. §§ 1501–1532 (Chapter 15 is
reserved for ancillary and cross-border cases).
154
Id. §§ 701–784 (Chapter 7 provides for liquidation proceedings. Chapter 7 can be filed for by
individuals and corporations and is the most common type of bankruptcy case); id. § 901–946 (Municipalities
and other governmental entities file for chapter 9 bankruptcy); id. §§ 1101–1174 (Chapter 11 proceedings are
reorganization proceedings and are typically pursued by legal entities, not individuals); id. §§ 1201–1232
(Chapter 12 is a debtor who is a family farmer or fisherman with a regular income); id. §§ 1301–1330 (Chapter
13 allows for the adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income); id. §§ 1501–1532 (Chapter 15 is
reserved for ancillary and cross-border cases).
155
In re Pierre, 468 B.R. 419, 424–25 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595 (1977)).
156
Bein, supra note 148, at 667–68.
157
Compare Chapter 13–Bankruptcy Basics, UNITED STATES COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-13-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Sept. 19, 2020)
(Chapter 13 allows a debtor to pay debt over 3-5 years and keep property), with Chapter 7–Bankruptcy Basics,
UNITED STATES COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7bankruptcy-basics (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (A chapter 7 Bankruptcy proceeding requires debtors to sell their
nonexempt property and distribute the proceeds to creditors).
158
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A)–(C) (2019) (A “creditor” is “an entity that has a claim against the debtor
that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor; [an] entity that has a claim against
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available in chapter 7, leaving a greater opportunity for more of the debtor’s debt
to be discharged.159 While chapter 13 cases are typically longer than chapter 7
cases and thus require more legal fees, this Comment argues that an exoneree
should be entitled to both an expedited discharge and a bankruptcy attorney at
no cost.160 With a bankruptcy attorney assigned cost-free to the exoneree,
chapter 13 offers the best way for him to achieve a fresh start.
1. Eligibility for Chapter 13
To be eligible for chapter 13, a debtor must (1) be an individual; (2) have a
regular income; and (3) meet certain debt limitations.161 Courts have not required
a particularly strong showing of regular income, and the exoneree could
potentially argue that pending compensation could meet this standard.162
Chapter 13 also requires that both bankruptcy petitions and payment plans be
filed in good faith.163 Good faith is considered by using a subjective test that
considers the totality of the debtor’s circumstances.164 If the court determines a
lack of good faith, it may dismiss the case or convert the case to chapter 7.
Courts first consider whether the bankruptcy petition was filed in good faith.
Factors considered by courts include:
The nature of the debtor’s debts; the timing of the petition; how the
debts in question arose; the debtor’s motive in filing the petition; how
the debtor’s actions affected creditors; the debtor’s treatment of
creditors both before and after the petition was filed; and whether the
debtor has been forthcoming with the bankruptcy court and the
creditors.165

the estate . . . or an entity that has a community claim.”).
159
Bein, supra note 148, at 668.
160
Dickerson, supra note 2, at 629.
161
Currently, individuals with assets less than $394,725 in unsecured debt and $1,184,200 in secured debt
may filed for chapter 13 relief, though the amount is amended by Congress occasionally. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
162
If the exoneree has been unable to secure employment, the Chapter 13 proof of income requirement
could also be satisfied by a spouse if the petition is filed jointly. See Robert G. Drummond, Disposable Income
Requirements Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 57 MONT. L. REV. 423, 424 (1996) (“[T]he disposable
income requirement is a flexible concept which has challenged the interpretive power of the courts.”).
163
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).
164
Bein, supra note 148, at 657 (“The evaluation of a debtor’s good faith, which relies not on the
application of a mechanical or mathematical test, but instead on a judge’s assessment of whether the facts and
circumstances, in their totality, meet a broadly defined conceptual standard, is inherently subjective.”).
165
Bein, supra note 148, at 671 (citing In re Lilley, 91 F.3d 491, 496 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Cabral, 285
B.R. 563, 573 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002); In re Kerschner, 246 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2000); In re Goddard,
212 B.R. 233, 237–38 (D.N.J. 1997)).
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The good faith test is “one of the central, perhaps the most important
confirmation finding to be made by the court in any chapter 13 case.”166 The
burden of proving good faith lies with the debtor.167 If an exoneree were to file
for bankruptcy, these factors would help a court evaluate the reason he filed the
chapter 13 petition.
The exoneree’s wrongful incarceration will affect a court’s analysis of the
factors. For example, the timing of filing the petition is often at issue. If a debtor
files a petition too long after the accrual of the debt, a court might weigh that
fact against them when considering his eligibility for chapter 13. But an
exoneree would have a strong counterargument because it is nearly impossible
to file a bankruptcy petition from prison. Similarly, a debtor must meet with his
appointed trustee and creditors.168 Neither the debtor nor the court can waive this
meeting.169 Courts have held that missing a deadline or failing to file a motion
properly due to incarceration is not justifiable.170 But incarcerated individuals
are almost always unable to file bankruptcy due to these limitations.171
Exonerees should not be further punished for their wrongful incarceration
because they could not overcome these limitations while in prison.
The next question to be analyzed is whether the chapter 13 payment plan
was proposed in good faith. The court analyzes the following factors:
The amount of the proposed plan payments and the amount of the
debtor’s surplus; the duration of the plan; the percentage of payment
to unsecured creditors; whether the debtor has stated his debts and
expenses accurately; the debtor’s employment history, ability to earn,
and likelihood of future increases in income; the frequency with which
the debtor has sought relief under the Bankruptcy Code; the existence
of special circumstances (such as inordinate medical expenses); the
nature of the debt sought to be discharged; the debtor’s motivation and
sincerity in seeking chapter 13 relief; the extent of preferential
treatment between classes of creditors; whether the debtor has unfairly
manipulated the Bankruptcy Code; whether the debt to be discharged
would be nondischargeable in a case under chapter 7; whether the
debtor has made any fraudulent misrepresentations to mislead the
bankruptcy court; the extent to which secured claims are modified; and

166
167
168
169
170
171

Bein, supra note 148, at 673 (citiation omitted).
Bein, supra note 148, at 674 (citations omitted).
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 201 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 341(d)).
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 201 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 341(d)).
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 201.
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 203.
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the burden which the plan’s administration would impose on the
trustee.172

Under this analysis of good faith, the debtor’s pre-petition behavior is heavily
weighted.173 Some of these factors for exonerees—such as employment history,
the existence of special circumstances, motivation and sincerity in seeking
chapter 13 relief, and the nature of the debt sought to be discharged—will look
much different than they would for an ordinary debtor. An exoneree will not
have the same ability to demonstrate a productive employment history or credit
history due to his wrongful incarceration.
Courts have also emphasized how chapter 13 focuses on the accountability
of the debtor.174 Although the hardships endured by an exoneree reentering
society are foreseeable, they are also the result of a “sufficient and proximate
cause.”175 An exoneree’s wrongful conviction is the proximate cause of many
financial and personal difficulties he faces upon release from prison.176 An
exoneree should not be held accountable for debts that were outside of his
control while he was wrongfully incarcerated, nor should he be held accountable
for debts that accumulated as a result of wrongful incarceration.
Within fourteen days of filing a bankruptcy petition, the debtor must file a
repayment plan unless granted an extension by the court.177 The chapter 13 plan
must propose a strategy to repay a portion, or in rare circumstances, all of the
debtor’s debt, over the course of three to five years.178 Regardless of whether the
plan has been approved by the court, the debtor must begin making plan
payments to the trustee within thirty days of filing the bankruptcy petition.179
The chapter 13 plan may be modified either before or after confirmation by the
court.180
A chapter 13 case ends in a few different circumstances: (1) the plan has
been successfully completed; (2) the case has been converted to chapter 7; or (3)

172

Bein, supra note 148, at 675 (citations omitted).
Bein, supra note 148, at 674.
174
In re Grice, 319 B.R. 141, 146 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2004) (The court declined to “elevate this statutory
requirement and does not see any policy that would be served by reading into the statute a more heightened
showing” under the factual circumstances of the case.).
175
In re Bandilli, 231 B.R. 836, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999).
176
See supra Section I(C).
177
FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b).
178
11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a)(1), 1322(d) (2019).
179
Id. § 1326(a)(1).
180
Id. §§ 1323, 1329(a).
173
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the debtor receives a discharge from his debt.181 The debtor will receive a
discharge only if the plan has been confirmed and payments under the plan have
been made or have been judicially excused.182 One path to judicial excusal is
through the hardship discharge, which is analyzed below.
2. The Hardship Discharge
The general discharge mechanism is one of the greatest benefits of chapter
13 bankruptcy and is reserved for those who are deserving of a fresh start:
[w]hen put to the test, bankruptcy law turns to the subjective
application of moral principles in order to satisfy society’s need for the
just and equitable balancing of the debtor’s interest in a fresh start with
society’s desire to deny the privileges of discharge to those who have
behaved reprehensibly and have failed to act to remedy their
wrongdoing.183

Chapter 13 of the Code allows for the discharge of debt for natural persons after
the following occurs: (1) the filing of the bankruptcy petition; (2) objections
from the creditors to the debtor’s eligibility for a chapter 13 bankruptcy; (3)
proofs of claims filed by the creditors; (4) a plan, as proposed by the debtor; (5)
confirmation of the plan by the court; (6) fulfillment of the plan by the debtor;
and (7) discharge of debt.184 Chapter 13 allows “an insolvent individual to
discharge certain unpaid debts toward that end.”185
If the chapter 13 plan is confirmed, but the debtor is unable to fulfill the
obligations of the plan, he may request a hardship discharge.186 The discharge is
instrumental to the “fresh start” policy because it generally protects debtors from
efforts to collect pre-petition debt and also voids any personal liability for
discharged debt.187 Section 1328(b) of the Code provides that, in order to

181
If a chapter 13 debtor is unable to complete plan payments, he may request that the case be converted
to chapter 7 and that his estate be liquidated. Id. § 1307(a). If the case is converted, the confirmation plan is
effectively vacated. The goal of an exoneree filing for bankruptcy is likely not to liquidate his estate and
surrender his property, so it is unlikely that the exoneree would make such a request. Ahart, supra note 16, at
584 n.132. But see In re Dudley, 405 B.R. 790, 799 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009) (citing In re Fox, 370 B.R. 639,
647–48 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007)).
182
See 11 U.S.C. § 1328.
183
Bein, supra note 148, at 687 (citations omitted).
184
164 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 239 (2017).
185
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007); see Thomas B. McNamara,
Fresh Start at the Bankruptcy Court, 47 COLO. LAW. 12, 12 (2018) (“The cornerstone of American bankruptcy
law is the chance for a ‘fresh start.’”).
186
164 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 239 (2017).
187
Bein, supra note 148, at 658 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2019)).
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successfully obtain a hardship discharge, the debtor must demonstrate: (1) he
cannot make all payments due to circumstances for which the debtor “should not
justly be held accountable”; (2) the value of property distributed under the plan
would be no less than what would be distributed in a chapter 7 case; and (3)
modification under section 1329 “is not practicable.”188 The right to discharge
“is statutory and should be liberally construed so as to give the honest but
unfortunate debtor a fresh start in life.”189 Further, while creditors may object to
the dischargeability of debt, the grant or denial of a request for a hardship
discharge is ultimately left to the discretion of the bankruptcy court.190
Although a chapter 13 plan typically lasts three to five years, this Comment
argues that, due to the dire nature of their circumstances, exonerees should be
entitled to an expedited hardship discharge. By virtue of being wrongfully
convicted, an exoneree has spent unjustified time in the criminal legal system,
through the process of investigation and conviction, appeals, wrongful
incarceration, and exoneration. Thus, it is important that an exoneree not only
have the choice to enter into a chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding, but also that
an exoneree be entitled to an expedited hardship discharge of his debt. The
exoneree should have the choice of whether he would like to engage further with
the United States court system. Although litigation could end in financial relief
for the exoneree and his family, his trust in the legal system is not likely to be
high. An exoneree should meet the requirements set forth by section 1328(b),
qualifying them for a hardship discharge, as analyzed below.
a. Circumstances Beyond the Exoneree’s Control
The first prong of the hardship discharge is whether the debtor cannot make
all plan payments because of circumstances that are beyond his control. Due to
the barriers exonerees face throughout reentry, obtaining employment and
successfully completing a payment plan would be challenging. These barriers
stem from their wrongful incarceration, which was a circumstance beyond their
control. Courts have interpreted this element of the hardship discharge
differently.191 Courts rely on a fact-driven analysis of whether the debtor should
be held justly accountable, including factors such as:

188

11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2019).
In re Lambert, 10 B.R. 223, 226 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
190
In re Bandilli, 231 B.R. 836, 838 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999); Bein, supra note 148, at 663 (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(a)); see Ahart, supra note 16, at 583.
191
See In re Bandilli, 231 B.R. at 839–40 (“[M]ost bankruptcy courts that have addressed the issue have
allowed a hardship discharge only when a debtor has suffered from catastrophic circumstances that directly
cause the debtor to be unable to complete plan payments . . . We are unwilling to read the word catastrophic into
189
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whether the debtor has presented substantial evidence that he or
she had the ability and intention to perform under the plan at the
time of confirmation;
whether the debtor did materially perform under the plan from
the date of confirmation until the date of the intervening event or
events;
whether the intervening event or events were reasonably
foreseeable at the time of confirmation of the chapter 13 plan;
whether the intervening event or events are expected to continue
in the reasonably foreseeable future;
whether the debtor had control, direct or indirect, of the
intervening event or events; and
whether the intervening event or events constituted a sufficient
and proximate cause for the failure to make the required
payments.192

The most difficult element of the hardship discharge for the exoneree to satisfy
will likely be that the debtor must be unable to complete the bankruptcy plan
payments due to circumstances that did not exist and were not foreseeable at the
time of the plan confirmation.193 Clearly, if an exoneree is arguing that his
wrongful conviction is the “intervening event” that justifies his motion for a
hardship discharge, the “intervening event” happened long before filing for
bankruptcy and was thus foreseeable.
Yet an exoneree could argue that he should be eligible for a hardship
discharge despite the timing of the intervening event. Chapter 13 discharge is
left to the court’s discretion.194 A study examining whether “non-law
determinations” influenced judicial rulings on the discharge of debt indicates
that more sympathetic causes of debt might make a judge more likely to
discharge debt.195 Surely a wrongful conviction warrants judicial sympathy.
the statute.”) (internal citations omitted).
192
Id. at 840.
193
See In re Edwards, 207 B.R. 728, 731 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997).
194
In re Bandilli, 231 B.R. at 838.
195
This study included 201 bankruptcy judges (who represented 57% of all sitting bankruptcy judges at
the time) who were presented with a question of the discharge of credit card debt in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case.
This study presented four different conditions for the accumulation of the debtor’s recent debt: (1) a “vacationer,”
who incurred the debt while on spring break in Florida. The vacationer paid for a hotel room, meals, and drinks
with friends; and (2) a “caretaker,” who accumulated the debt while visiting her mother in Florida because her
mother was fighting cancer, did not have health insurance, and needed help recovering from surgery. Scenarios
3 and 4 included a vacationer and caretaker debtor, but of a different gender. Although in all scenarios the debt
was incurred knowing that it could not be repaid, only 32% of judges discharged the vacationer’s debt and 52%
of judges discharged the caretaker’s debt. The study found that the judges “apparently allowed their sympathy
or respect for the debtor who fraudulently incurred the credit card debt to care for his or her mother to influence
their decisions.” Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do Judges
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b. Chapter 7 Analysis
The second prong of the hardship discharge requires the value of property
distributed under the plan to be no less than what would be distributed in a
chapter 7 case. This prong is also known as the Best Interests Test, which works
to ensure that chapter 13 unsecured creditors are no worse off at the end of the
case than if the debtor had filed a chapter 7 petition.196 In a chapter 7 case, if the
lower priority, unsecured creditors are not paid through the operation of the plan,
the debtor’s remaining assets can be liquidated to make up for this deficit.197
Thus, in chapter 13, the value of the property to be distributed to each allowed
unsecured claim must be greater than or equal to the amount that would be paid
on the same claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7.198
This test promotes the twin aims of the bankruptcy system, as it functions as a
safeguard for creditors in chapter 13 cases.199
However, due to the amount of debt incarcerated individuals can accumulate
during prison and the amount of lost opportunity to earn meaningful wages while
incarcerated and after release, it is unlikely that the bankruptcy estate will have
any value.200 If this is true, the second prong of the hardship discharge test will
be satisfied.201 Courts have held that a chapter 13 plan will qualify for a hardship
discharge if an estate’s value is so low it would not allow distribution to
unsecured creditors. 202 This prong of the hardship discharge should not be
difficult for the exoneree to satisfy because his estate is likely to be of little value
due to his time in prison.

Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 887–90 (2015).
196
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2019); Midstate Fin. Co., Inc. v. Peoples, 587 B.R. 685, 691 (E.D. Tenn. 2018).
197
11 U.S.C. § 726.
198
Id. § 1325(a)(4); see In re Chavis, 47 F.3d 818, 824 (6th Cir. 1995).
199
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 196 (“Bankruptcy’s great economic virtue is that it avoids the collective
action problem among creditors who would otherwise compete against one another for the debtor’s funds; it
instead benefits creditors by allowing them to recover or write off debt in an orderly, predictable, and costeffective manner.”).
200
See supra Section I(C).
201
See Matter of Mixson, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 1674, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Apr. 14, 2016) (holding that
as the sole provider of her family due to her ex-husband’s incarceration, she should not be held accountable for
funding a payment plan while her husband is incarcerated and unemployed).
202
In re Watkins, 379 B.R. 403, 407 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (“Because the liquidation of the [] estate in
a hypothetical chapter 7 case would yield no funds for distribution to unsecured creditors, regardless of the
validity of the Debtor’s claimed exemptions, the Trustee’s objection to the Debtor’s claimed exemptions is
MOOT and the Objection to the Plan . . . must be overruled.”); In re Marrero, 7 B.R. 589, 590 (Bankr. D. P.R.
1980) (although hardship discharge was denied for other reasons, the debtor met the chapter 7 requirement of
the hardship discharge because of a zero-asset estate.); In re Cummins, 266 B.R. 852, 855 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
2001).
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c. Modification of the Plan
The third prong of the hardship discharge evaluates whether modification of
the payment plan is practicable. If the debtor is unable to make the plan
payments, he can move the court to adjust the plan, which would allow him to
make smaller payments.203 If the debtor’s living expenses exceed his earned
after-tax income, further plan payments can be deemed impossible.204 Plan
modifications or adjustments are unlikely to be allowed unless there is a clear,
effective remedy for the debtor.205 Courts have held that it is not practicable to
change a plan where there is no source of income to fund the modified plan.206
This is especially true in the case of an exoneree, considering the many
challenges that he faces.207
d. Exceptions to Discharge
Certain types of debt are excepted from chapter 13 discharge, yet there is a
clear argument to allow these exceptions in light of the extreme circumstances
surrounding wrongful conviction. For example, student loans are consistently
excluded from chapter 7 and chapter 13 discharge. It is possible that an exoneree
accumulated both student loans and interest on his student loans before or during
his time in prison. Courts have allowed the discharge of student loans in the
event of undue hardship.208
The undue hardship discharge for student loan claims relies on a demanding
test, for which “only the most sympathetic can qualify.”209 This test is articulated
in Brunner, and requires that the debtor: (1) cannot maintain a “minimal”
standard of living; (2) has additional circumstances exist that would prevent this
“minimal” standard of living to change for a significant portion of the repayment
period of student loans; and (3) must have made good faith efforts to repay the
loans.210 Perhaps helpfully, “[s]ome courts have held that a criminal record,
because of its negative effect on earning capacity, can help the debtor meet the
203

11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)–(2).
Ahart, supra note 16, at 576–78.
205
Id. (“But nearly all courts have denied such a request.”).
206
See In re Cummins, 266 B.R. 852, 855 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001); see supra Section I for an explanation
of the challenges that an exoneree might face that would make modifying a payment plan impracticable.
207
See Matter of Mixson, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 1674, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Apr. 14, 2016) (holding that
modifying the payment plan of the ex-wife of an incarcerated man would not be practicable as she was
unemployed on the Petition date, and her prospects of employment were minimal).
208
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 210.
209
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 210.
210
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 210 n. 108 (citing Brunner v. NY State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831
F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987)).
204
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undue hardship exception; others have emphatically rejected that reasoning.”211
If a criminal record has aided an undue hardship exception claim, then surely a
criminal record that resulted from a wrongful conviction would be helpful in an
undue hardship claim for student loans that accumulated as a result of wrongful
conviction.
There are additional exceptions to the hardship discharge of section 1328(b),
including those defined by section 523(a).212 Exceptions to discharge underlie
the notion that the Code attempts to provide equitable treatment to debtors and
creditors.213 Generally, the exceptions “can be loosely grouped into two
categories: those implicating overriding policy issues and those implicating the
debtor’s own misconduct.”214 The first category of exceptions includes tax
claims, child support or alimony, debts for injuries to person or property, debts
to governmental units for fines and penalties, certain educational loans, and
obligations affected by fraud or maliciousness.215 The second category of
exceptions:
[I]s designed to advance the fundamental policy of affording relief
only to the ‘honest but unfortunate’ debtor . . . including: debts arising
from the debtor’s fraudulent conduct; claims arising from willful and
malicious injury caused by the debtor; criminal fines and restitution
obligations; claims arising from injury or death caused by the debtor
while driving while intoxicated; and claims for which discharge was
denied in a prior bankruptcy case.216

Bankruptcy courts have found that a chapter 13 discharge does not discharge
any debt that is listed as an exception set forth by the Code.217
Although these exceptions could present a barrier for the exoneree, there is
still an avenue to relief through a hardship discharge. First, courts have held in
favor of debtors in order to provide the fresh start that bankruptcy can give to a
debtor.218 Second, if eligible for relief, discharging attorney’s fees would likely
211
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 210 (citing In re Douglas, 366 B.R. 241, 257–59 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
2007); In re Coman, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1361, at *3, *5 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2003)).
212
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(17) (2019) (“[F]or a fee imposed on a prisoner by any court for the filing of a case,
motion, complaint, or appeal, or for other costs and expenses assessed with respect to such filing”).
213
See Bein, supra note 148, at 665.
214
Bein, supra note 148, at 665.
215
11 U.S.C. § 523(a); Bein, supra note 148, at 665.
216
Bein, supra note 148, at 666 (citations omitted).
217
11 U.S.C. § 523; id. § 1328; see In re Humphries, 516 B.R. 856 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2014); In re
Vasquez, 261 B.R. 654 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001).
218
In re Howard, 339 B.R. 913, 918 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (“To advance the policy of giving the debtor
a fresh start in bankruptcy, exceptions to discharge are construed strictly against the creditor and liberally in
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provide an enormous amount of relief to the exoneree. Some courts have held
that “pay to stay debt” is not excepted from discharge.219 Discharging debt
stemming from attorney’s fees and the exoneree’s family members during the
time of his imprisonment would help all parties obtain a semblance of a fresh
start through the bankruptcy system.
IV. INCLUDING EXONEREES IN THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
This Section describes what providing the wrongfully convicted access to
the bankruptcy system would entail. Part A proposes how exonerees could gain
access to the bankruptcy system. Part B discusses the benefits of discharging the
debts of exonerees, including the potential symbiotic relationship between the
criminal legal system and the bankruptcy system. Finally, Part C addresses
potential criticisms of the implications of including exonerees in the hardship
discharge.
A. Proposal
Exonerees should be entitled to an expedited chapter 13 discharge. Further,
states should provide more holistic reentry programs, including access to
bankruptcy attorney services. This proposal outlines what providing an exoneree
meaningful access to the bankruptcy system would entail.
Relief could be obtained through the hardship discharge provided by chapter
13 of the Code. An exoneree can obtain relief through the hardship discharge by
passing the three-part test of section 1328(b).220 An exoneree would also need
to demonstrate that he filed his bankruptcy petition in good faith and that his
proposed confirmation plan was filed in good faith. This subjective analysis of
good faith would surely tilt in the exoneree’s favor, as he is seeking discharge
from debts that are a result of the miscarriage of justice that caused his wrongful
conviction. For the reasons set forth above, exonerees should meet the
requirements of this test.
While the bankruptcy system provides this opportunity to aid exonerees,
exonerees need representation throughout these proceedings. If the exoneree is
filing for bankruptcy following a prison term, it is unlikely that he has

favor of the debtor.”).
219
In re Milan, 546 B.R. 187, 198 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2016), aff’d, 556 B.R. 922 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he Incarceration Costs are compensation for actual pecuniary loss within the meaning of § 523(a)(7). As
such, they are dischargeable and were discharged.”).
220
See supra pages 34–35; 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b).
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accumulated wealth due to the many circumstances surrounding his wrongful
conviction and the potential subsequent accumulation of debt. Exonerees face
many challenges when reentering society; obtaining and paying for a bankruptcy
attorney could seem impossible.
Reentry programs would help if properly tailored to address individualized
needs. An exoneree would have a more meaningful opportunity to obtain
financial relief if provided reentry services that guarantee access to bankruptcy
attorney services. It would be even more beneficial for these programs to ensure
that the exoneree has an attorney who specializes in bankruptcy law.221 Finally,
providing a bankruptcy attorney would avoid the issue of an exoneree being
represented by his prior attorney, who is likely a claimant in the bankruptcy
proceeding.
After Innocence is one model reentry program that coordinates access to
bankruptcy representation for exonerees. This organization is dedicated to
working with exonerees through a three-part program, including providing
access to bankruptcy attorneys.222 It recognizes the importance of a holistic
approach to assisting exonerees with reentry and could be used as a model for
future assistance given to exonerees. If states implemented similarly holistic
reentry models, states could begin to reconcile the enormous debt owed to
exonerees due to their wrongful conviction.
Sadly, no amount of compensation can rectify the damage inflicted by
wrongful incarceration.223 Yet if exonerees and their families received an
expedited discharge from the debt accumulated during the period of wrongful
incarceration, the bankruptcy system and the criminal legal system could help
provide a fresh start for an exoneree’s financial future.
B. Benefits of Discharging the Debts of Exonerees
Discharging the debts of exonerees would be beneficial to both the
bankruptcy system and the criminal legal system. The first part of this section
221
See, e.g., Pardo, supra note 3, at 1119–20 (“Accordingly, if a debtor is to successfully navigate the
complex path that ultimately culminates in a discharge, it stands to reason that the assistance of an expert will
be indispensable in doing so.”).
222
Connecting Exonerees to the Support They Are Eligible For, AFTER INNOCENCE, https://www.afterinnocence.org/coordinating (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (coordinating access to health care, social services, and
legal representation for record expungement, restoration of rights and public benefits, housing issues, domestic
support, and bankruptcy or tax problems.).
223
Shaw, supra note 85, at 613 (“Money is not what makes these individuals whole. The only way to truly
restore these individuals to any semblance of their previous lives is to reintegrate them into society so they
function as normal citizens.”).
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considers how the bankruptcy system and the criminal legal system could work
collaboratively. The second part of this Section considers two exonerees’
experience with financial distress and describes how proactively providing them
with an expedited hardship discharge could have helped avoid this financial
distress.
1. Symbiotic Relationship
Both systems share the common goal of providing a fresh start: the
bankruptcy system attempts to provide this fresh start through the discharge of
debt, while the criminal legal system attempts to provide this fresh start through
reentry programs. Yet both systems rely on ineffective mechanisms to provide a
clean slate. Some argue that “chapter 13, as currently constituted, is deeply
debilitated.”224 Critics have pointed to the racial bias prevalent in the bankruptcy
system:
[s]pecifically, the debtor who benefits the most from the relief
provided in the Code is married, has few non-dischargeable debts [],
has stable employment and disposable income, and has wealth that is
concentrated in assets that are protected from creditors[]. Given that,
the “Ideal Debtor” is white [].225

Further, bankruptcy courts have a history of being inaccessible to indigent
populations,226 with lower-income debtors facing more bias than a middle-class
debtor.227 The likelihood of a pro se debtor being successful in bankruptcy court
is staggeringly low, as contrasted with a debtor who has representation.228 The

224

Lawrence Ponoroff, Rethinking Chapter 13, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2 (2017); see Dickerson, supra note 2,

at 629.
225

See Dickerson, supra note 2, at 639.
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 457 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Congress may say that some
of the poor are too poor even to go bankrupt. I cannot agree.”); see Pardo, supra note 3, at 1115 (“[B]ankruptcy
poignantly presents an affordability paradox: the system’s purpose is to relieve individuals from financial
distress, yet it simultaneously demands a significant commitment of resources to obtain such relief”).
227
On class biases in the bankruptcy system, Lewandowski notes:
226

[B]ias in the Bankruptcy Code against low-income debtors’ economic culture makes bankruptcy
more burdensome for them than for middle-class debtors. These factors deter bankruptcy in
marginal cases by increasing the debtor’s perceived cost of filing, depriving debtors, creditors,
and society of the benefits the Bankruptcy Code is designed to provide. Bankruptcy can be
thought of as a public penance of austerity and submission to court authority that serves as a
substitute for payment and acknowledges the legitimacy of the creditors’ interests. Under this
articulation, a more arduous performance is unfairly being required of lower-income debtors
because of their economic status.
Lewandoski, supra note 56, at 228.
228
Pardo, supra note 3, at 1115 (showing self-represented debtors have a 28.5% litigation success rate
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complexity of the bankruptcy system creates an irony: someone experiencing
financial distress is essentially barred from filing for bankruptcy if he is too poor.
The debtor must navigate complex procedural barriers and faces a serious risk
of denial of discharge despite the merits of his claim.229
The similarity between the twin aims of the bankruptcy system and the
purpose of reentry programs for exonerees provides ample reason for the
criminal legal system and the bankruptcy system to develop a collaborative
process. The Supreme Court found that the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act of
1934
has been again and again emphasized by the courts as being of public
as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate
debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at
the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
preexisting debt.230

While the bankruptcy system presents a goal of providing relief to honest
but unfortunate debtors, the current inaccessibility of bankruptcy courts renders
this goal meaningless.231 Further, “[t]he bankruptcy discharge is a powerful
statutory right, but that right will have no value to intended beneficiaries who
cannot vindicate it as a result of procedural barriers.”232 By discharging the debts
that stem from wrongful conviction, the bankruptcy system would implement a
tool that provides mutual benefit to both the criminal legal system and the
bankruptcy system. The bankruptcy system would thus recommit to its intended
purpose “to allow and encourage debtors, freed from their debts, to once again
become productive members of society.”233 Meanwhile, the criminal legal
system would greatly improve reentry assistance to exonerees.
2. Proactivity Rather than Reactivity
This Section considers two examples of exonerees experiencing financial
distress. In both cases, had a bankruptcy attorney been provided to the exoneree

while a similarly situated debtor with representation has a 56.2% success rate).
229
Pardo, supra note 3, at 1116 (“Unfortunately, vindicating the right to a discharge has proved to be
elusive for certain individual debtors, not so much as a result of substantive eligibility rules,’ but rather because
of procedural barriers that increase the complexity of accessing the right.”).
230
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citation omitted).
231
Pardo, supra note 3, at 1180.
232
Pardo, supra note 3, at 1180.
233
Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Comment, The Paradoxical Bankruptcy Discharge: Rereading the Common
Law – Civil Law Relationship, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 293, 319 (2014).
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following his release from prison, financial distress could have been preempted
or greatly alleviated.
Financial literacy is already a struggle for many people in the United
States.234 This struggle is only exacerbated by time spent in prison and away
from society and the economy. By allowing exonerees to take control of their
financial status before they find themselves in financial hardship, the bankruptcy
system could prevent more dire outcomes.
Recall Clarence Harrison.235 While the $1 million he received was more than
many exonerees in Georgia have been awarded,236 his story illustrates how the
current compensation structures in the United States are failing.237 Mr. Harrison,
who obtained three jobs after his release from prison, sold $735,000 of future
payments for $272,000.238 With a lack of credit history due to his incarceration,
he owed 30% interest on the credit cards he obtained following his release.239
Shortly thereafter, he was hit by a car and severely injured. 240 Mr. Harrison’s
wife’s insurance only covered part of his hospital stay and left them with a
$50,000 medical bill.241 While in the hospital, he also lost his business.242
Moreover, he learned that he owed the Internal Revenue Service $90,000 in
taxes on an annuity that he had not known he would have to pay.243 Mr.
234

Dickerson, supra note 2, at 636.
See supra page 23. Mr. Harrison was released from prison in 2004 after serving nearly 18 years for a
rape he did not commit. Eight months after his release from prison, he was awarded $1 million through a bill
passed by the Georgia legislature. See also Exonerees, GEORGIA INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.
georgiainnocenceproject.org/exonerees/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2020).
236
See Calvin Johnson, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3329. (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (Calvin Johnson, who served 16
years, received $500,000); Douglas Echols, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.
edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3199. (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (Douglas Echols, who
served 5 years, received no compensation); Samuel Scott, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3623. (last visited Oct. 12, 2020)
(Samuel Scott, who served 15 years, received no compensation).
237
See Albert Samaha, Exonerated and Out of Prison—And That’s Where the Trouble Starts, BUZZFEED
NEWS, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/albertsamaha/exonerated-and-out-of-prison-and-thats-when-thetrouble-star#.jrjlbqnzL. (last visited Sept. 11, 2020).
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id. The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 ultimately created the Wrongful
Incarceration Exclusion, which does not include in income any civil damages, restitution, or other monetary
award received that relates to wrongful conviction. See IRS, PATH Act Tax Related Provisions,
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/path-act-tax-related-provisions (last visited Aug. 31, 2020); IRS, Wrongful
Incarceration FAQs, https://www.irs.gov/individuals/wrongful-incarceration-faqs (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
While Mr. Harrison was eventually able to claim a refund, the initial payment undoubtedly contributed to his
235
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Harrison’s financial distress stemmed from circumstances beyond his control,
including a lack of financial literacy that he might have obtained had he not been
wrongfully incarcerated. Had Mr. Harrison been provided a holistic reentry
program, including a bankruptcy attorney, he would have been able to take
control of his financial status before falling into financial distress.
There is also the case of Theodore White, Jr., who was wrongfully convicted
of sexually molesting his 12-year-old adopted daughter in Missouri in 1999.244
He was exonerated six years later.245 In 2010, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a 2008
judgment awarding $15 million to Mr. White.246 This judgment was the result
of an action brought against the parties responsible for Mr. White’s
exoneration.247 Despite this seemingly large award, Mr. White was not equipped
to reenter the economy. In 2014, Mr. White filed a voluntary chapter 7
bankruptcy petition following a record of financial difficulty.248 A large
consideration for the bankruptcy court was that Mr. White did not file for
bankruptcy until three years after his debt had begun accumulating.249 Mr.
White’s case is an example of an exoneree’s bad experience in bankruptcy court.
His property was repossessed, and his estate was liquidated. His interaction with
the bankruptcy system was the result of a series of failed financial decisions.
Had Mr. White been provided a bankruptcy attorney upon his exoneration, he
would have reentered the society, and the economy, better equipped for success.
A reentry program that includes access to bankruptcy attorneys would
provide exonerees the opportunity to take a proactive approach to obtaining
financial freedom following their release from prison. Ideally, this would help
exonerees avoid financial distress and further involvement with the bankruptcy
system later in life, when their debts have become larger and more complicated.

financial distress.
244
Theodore White, Jr., THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3737 (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
245
Id.
246
In re White, 606 B.R. 908, 913 (Bankr. D. Utah 2019).
247
Id.
248
In re White, 2018 Bankr. LEXIS 95, at *2–3 (Bankr. D. Utah Jan. 17, 2018). Mr. White faced many
financial difficulties, including at least $328,714.68 in non-priority, undisputed, non-contingent, liquidated,
unsecured debt that accumulated before 2011 and remained unpaid when he filed for bankruptcy in 2014; Mr.
White also faced repossession of his home, a boat, and two cars. Id.
249
Id. at *3.
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C. Implications
Over the course of different Code amendments and enactments, chapter 13
has elicited criticism.250 The criminal legal system has also elicited criticism, as
the system has attempted to reconcile the trauma inflicted by wrongful
incarceration. This Comment addresses three criticisms of the bankruptcy
system and the criminal legal system.
First, this Section discusses the criticism that the expansion of chapter 13
discharge might lead to an incentivization of the debtor to accumulate debt.
Second, this Section responds to the argument that adopting this proposal would
lead to an overly sympathetic treatment of debtors and exonerees. It looks to
criticisms of the scope of chapter 13 discharge, which suggest that the discharge
has been expanded to include too many types of dischargeable debts and too
many types of debtors. Third, and finally, this Section addresses the question of
whether giving a discharge to exonerees is a slippery slope towards providing
too much financial assistance to the wrongfully convicted. This Comment argues
that discharging the debt of exonerees and their families would not validate any
of these criticisms.
1. Incentivizing the Accumulation of Debt
One critique of chapter 13 discharge is that “discharge creates a moral hazard
because it grants debtors the equivalent of free insolvency insurance, thereby
incentivizing them to take on more debts and strategically employ the fresh start
benefit.”251 But allowing exonerees expedited access to chapter 13 would not be
incentivizing families and exonerees to accumulate debt during the period of
wrongful incarceration. There is no guarantee that a wrongfully convicted
person will be exonerated. In fact, there are plenty of posthumous exonerations,
such as in the case of Timothy Cole, that reinforce the idea that no person can
rely on the criminal legal system to free him from a wrongful conviction in his
lifetime.252 Of course, many wrongfully convicted individuals are never
exonerated.253 Thus, incarcerated individuals are not likely to accumulate debt
with the expectation that it will be relieved through a bankruptcy discharge. For
these reasons, bankruptcy courts should not fear furthering criticism of the
bankruptcy system by discharging the debts of exonerees.
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2. Over-Inclusivity of Chapter 13 Discharge
Some critics have focused on a debtor’s ability to discharge debt in chapter
13 that would not be dischargeable in chapter 7, questioning if chapter 13 could
act as a “haven” for the “dishonest debtor” who seeks discharge of debt
stemming from criminal activity, such as criminal restitution.254 Yet
exonerations are, by definition, “cases in which a person was wrongly convicted
of a crime and later cleared of all the charges based on new evidence of
innocence.”255 Further, “[a]bsent conviction of a crime, one is presumed
innocent.”256 This Comment argues that exonerees and their families should be
relieved of the debts that stemmed from wrongful conviction because the debts
are not a result of criminal behavior by the incarcerated person. Instead, these
debts are the result of the failure of the criminal legal system.
Another criticism of chapter 13 suggests that the original goal of protecting
the honest but unfortunate debtor has morphed to protect dishonest, overindebted debtors.257 As chapter 13 discharge has evolved,
“a radical new reading of the expression ‘honest but unfortunate’ . . .
now extends the concept of ‘misfortune’ to include all debtors who are
unable to repay a debt, even when the debt originated as the result of
a bad financial judgment, imprudence, or sometimes, a fraudulent
act.”258

But by discharging the debts of exonerees, the bankruptcy system would not be
painting with too broad a brush with respect to what constitutes an unfortunate
debtor. Exonerees suffer from one of the greatest misfortunes society can cause:
the wrongful imprisonment of a person for crimes he did not commit. By
allowing the discharge of debts that stemmed from wrongful incarceration,
bankruptcy courts would not be making the discharge over-inclusive. Instead,
bankruptcy courts would be allowing these honest but unfortunate debtors to
obtain a fresh start.
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See, e.g., Susan Jensen-Conklin, Nondischargeable Debts in Chapter 13: Fresh Start or Haven for
Criminals, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 517 (1990); Ellen M. Horn, Good Faith and Chapter 13 Discharge: How Much
Discretion is Too Much, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 657, 657–58 (1990).
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Elgueta, supra note 233, at 315–16 (arguing that the “super discharge” of Chapter 13 “reveals the
enormous divide between the original rationale of the policy . . . and the modern version.”).
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Elgueta, supra note 233, at 316 (quoting Douglas G. Baird, Discharge, Waiver, and the Behavioral
Undercurrents of Debtor-Creditor Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 17, 25 (2006)).
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3. Slippery Slope of Aid to Exonerees
Critics have also questioned how much aid to give exonerees and at what
point this aid becomes unproductive for society as a whole. For instance, Justice
Alito, concurring in the recent Supreme Court opinion in Nelson, raised the issue
of extending refunds to all costs associated with wrongful conviction.259 He
questioned, “if the status quo ante must be restored, why shouldn’t the defendant
be compensated for all the adverse economic consequences of the wrongful
conviction?”260 Justice Gorsuch also pointed out that costs associated with court
fines and restitution will likely be “minor in comparison to the losses that result
from conviction and imprisonment, such as attorney’s fees, lost income, and
damage to reputation.”261 As noted by this Comment, those losses are, indeed,
huge, and are arguably the most important to address.262 Not all of these losses
can be addressed by the bankruptcy system; for example, the bankruptcy system
cannot compensate an exoneree for harms due to lost earnings or damage to
reputation. But it may provide an opportunity to extend restorative relief to
exonerees by discharging the debt that stems from wrongful conviction.
Society has not begun to relieve itself of the debt it owes the wrongfully
convicted without providing meaningful and substantial relief to exonerees.
“[F]reedom alone is not enough for the person who has been chewed up by the
criminal legal system and then spit out as wrongfully convicted, lacking
compensation for the harm suffered.”263 The majority opinion in Nelson wrote,
“[j]ust as the restoration of liberty on reversal of a conviction is not
compensation, neither is the return of money taken by the State on account of
the conviction.”264 In doing so, the Court constructed the notion that refunding
these fines and fees was a form of restoration, rather than compensation. If an
exoneree sought discharge from debt that stemmed from his wrongful
conviction, he would also be seeking restorative relief.
CONCLUSION
Wrongful conviction presents a paradoxical problem: society owes
exonerees a debt for the injuries its criminal legal system has inflicted on them.
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Yet exonerees often leave prison having accumulated debt. This Comment
argues that the bankruptcy system could solve this problem by providing
exonerees, quintessential “honest but unfortunate” people, relief through
expedited chapter 13 discharge. Further, states should provide reentry programs
that are specific to the issues exonerees face. These programs should provide
holistic support, including representation by bankruptcy attorneys. The
programs should not be capped monetarily but should instead guarantee the
services that exonerees need to successfully reenter society.
As the number of exonerations in the United States has increased, so has the
need for systems that holistically support exonerees when they reenter society.
The current compensation structure for the wrongfully convicted is insufficient
and ineffective. Exonerees have lost years in which they could have been
employed, and prison offers little opportunity to build experience to gain future,
meaningful employment. To make matters worse, while exonerees are
incarcerated, they and their families often go further into debt due to court fees
and fines, long legal battles, and the inability to receive funds from the
employment the exoneree could have had during his incarceration.
The bankruptcy system and reentry programs share a common goal:
providing a fresh start to those who have been deemed honest but have endured
unfortunate circumstances. While both systems do not currently function
effectively, these systems could work in tandem to improve. If reentry programs
were supplemented with access to representation in bankruptcy courts, the
bankruptcy system could help promote holistic and successful reentry for
exonerees while reaffirming its commitment to rewarding honest but unfortunate
debtors with discharge from debt. By relieving exonerees of the debt that
stemmed from their wrongful incarceration, society will begin to repay the debt
that is owed to the wrongfully convicted.
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